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ABSTRACT
This work examines Henry VIII’s contribution to the legal defining and treatment of
piracy during his reign and his influence over subsequent Tudor monarchs’ own relationship
with piracy and privateering. Through examination of the shift in legal language, piracy as a
crime to a paid profession, and the ambiguous definition of who a pirate was it becomes clear
that Henry’s reign witnessed a significant transformation in piracy which directly influenced
diplomatic relations throughout Europe.
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INTRODUCTION
PIRACY: THE PUSH TO TURN A HOLLYWOOD CHARACTER INTO A HISTORICAL
FIGURE

Blackbeard, Henry Morgan, and even Disney’s Captain Jack Sparrow are all names
which come to mind when one mentions pirates. For most, a pirate represents a fictional
character who separates himself from the chains of society to freely roam the sea and find hidden
treasures that create an air of romance and adventure. Visit any coastal town and you can almost
immediately find references to eye patches, peg legs, and parrots, all representing the caricature
of the pirate created and expounded upon by Hollywood. Recently, however, historians have
started challenging this popular image and examining pirates not as biopics but as serious
characters among larger historical narratives. Pirates are no longer separate from society but
agents who influenced and altered trade, diplomacy, and naval strategies whether they actively
chose to impact those on land or not. Despite the push back from scholars against viewing
piracy only as romanticized stories, there has still been a gap in the literature. The main focus of
piracy resides in the field of Atlantic history during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603).
Despite piracy existing prior to Elizabeth, any serious study before her reign has largely been
ignored. A new push to broaden the scope of piracy in history will further cause historians to
take a field seriously which still faces resistance in academia.

1

The history of piracy began to emerge in the twentieth century. At that time, historians
such as C. H. Haring, Cyrus H. Karraker, and Bernard Bailyn all contributed to an academic shift
away from popular romantic notions of piracy by connecting piracy with imperial commerce. In
1910, C. H. Haring was the first historian to discuss piracy and connect buccaneers with the
English colonies of the West Indies. His work focused on tracing the policies that the English
and French governments pursued against buccaneers who acted without authority of the crown in
European affairs. For Haring, these buccaneers were nuisances who prohibited trade between
Europe and the colonies. Significantly, Haring refuted previous romantic notions of piracy
through descriptions of buccaneers as “pack animals” attacking and targeting “prey” on the seas,
which portrayed a violent image that should not be idolized. To strengthen his rejection of the
popular portrayal of pirates, he focused on well-known pirates such as Captain Morgan and
Blackbeard in his work and ignored smaller, lesser-known piratical acts.1 Even though Haring’s
work was met with positive reception, it would not be until the 1950s that his call for a more
serious look at piracy received attention again. In 1953, Cyrus H. Karraker published Piracy was
a Business, a work which refuted Haring’s argument that acts of piracy hindered trade. Karraker
addressed the issue of previous historians examining only pirates’ anti-social elements and not
focusing on their influence on society. Karraker argued that merchants and politicians were, in
fact, in league with pirates and that piracy supplemented trade among imperial countries. He
found that England, France, and Spain all used piracy to undercut each other’s power and that
Francis I received help from Barbarossa, an Ottoman pirate, in war against Charles V.2 Karraker
found that rather than viewing merchants and pirates as separate entities, historians should
explore the complexities of their relationship to further understand Atlantic trade. This
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connection moved the pirate from the popular sphere as a romantic, almost mythical figure, into
the academic sphere, allowing historians to analyze pirates more seriously. Bernard Bailyn also
argued in 1955 that piracy held a familiar source of revenue for merchants in the seventeenth
century and that without piracy, merchants would have floundered.3 Bailyn’s main argument in
his book was that the failure to establish pious, devout merchants who furthered God’s work
actually led to the later success of New England’s commerce. New England’s relationship with
interlopers helped establish a successful economic community that without illicit trade would
have failed.4
Despite the importance of Haring, Karraker, and Bailyn for introducing piracy to the field
of history, piracy remained a fringe topic of study among historians until Christopher Hill,
renowned for his work on the English Revolution in the 1640s, wrote an article on piracy for a
publication of collected works in 1984. In his article, Hill called for scholars to look closer at the
social basis of piracy in addition to the economic and imperial lens already established.5
Through his use of a social lens, Hill found that instead of economic motivation, which Haring,
Karraker, and Bailyn all stressed, piracy provided radicals after 1640 with a way to escape
corrupt society and to practice democratic ideas. The West Indies gave increasing importance to
Utopian ideas as well as offering a refuge for persecuted radicals fleeing from England. Three
years after Hill’s call for a more serious look at piracy, Marcus Rediker published his first book,
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. Rediker, who is now known as the leading historian
of maritime history and piracy, did not focus on piracy explicitly in his first publication but on
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the common “jack tar” or seaman experience. Despite this, he contributed an important aspect to
the developing historiography through pointing out that the romantic image of seafaring had
obscured important features of life at sea in the preromantic era of the eighteenth century, such
as the development of an early system of democracy and social welfare that influenced labor
reforms on land. The previously held romantic image caused historians to misrepresent the
motives of men who cast their lot with the sea. Further, Rediker moved away from individual or
national terms, as Christopher Hill used in his work, and instead utilized international terms to
emphasize the communal aspect of maritime life. Rediker hoped to encourage other scholars to
explore the full range of activities of seamen and to study them on their own terms in order to
transform labor history into a working-class history.6
The link Hill created between piracy and ideological movements in consequence of the
English Revolution, combined with Rediker’s work on labor, caused increasing interest in the
field of piracy from numerous different focuses. Marcus Rediker continued to expand his work
on piracy and Hans Turley and Kenneth Kinkor responded to Hill’s call for a broader
examination of piracy with their own analyses of piracy’s effect on previously marginalized
groups such as homosexuals, women, and blacks. Turley countered previous scholars who tried
to uncover “real” pirates and instead attempted to uncover ways that the periodical press,
pamphlets, trial records, confessions of pirates, and other sources established the pirates as the
common enemy of all mankind. In 1999, Turley then used these sources to see how they
contributed to fictional representations to make connections with other representations of
masculine desire and individuality. From this method of analysis, he argued that eighteenthcentury depictions of pirates provided insight to certain ideas of masculinity as came to be
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understood as appropriate and normal.7 Turley’s work represented a move toward recognizing
the importance of studying piracy to understand deeper social contexts on land despite his
distinction of piracy as completely separate from landed society.
One year later, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker co-authored a book dedicated to
Christopher Hill which focused on the use of the mythology of the many-headed hydra as a tool
of the ruling class to justify violence against those outside of society the state viewed as a threat,
which included pirates. Linebaugh and Rediker argued that their focus allowed a means of
exploring multiplicity, movement, and connection to trace the currents of humanity.
Additionally, they attempted to recover the lost history of the multiethnic class that they viewed
as essential to the rise of capitalism and the modern global economy.8 Highly reflective of
Rediker’s previous work, this further emphasized the agency and necessity of seamen or pirates
in shaping the outcome of history and strengthened the call for historians to look more seriously
at maritime history and piracy.
Within the book, as in Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, only one chapter
focused on pirates. This one chapter, however, placed pirates in a larger role than simply
deviants on the sea. Both authors echoed Hill with their assertion that the ship became an engine
for capitalism and a setting of resistance from the ideas of revolutionaries, defeated and
repressed by King Charles I and Oliver Cromwell, who left England and persisted in their
ideologies. In fact, hydrarchy, as contemporaries labelled maritime society, rose as the era’s
most serious challenge to the rise of capitalism and specifically piracy remained the biggest issue
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facing Parliament and the Board of Trade.9 The assertion that hydrarchy became the most
serious challenge to capitalism seems to refute piracy’s role in serving the merchant community,
but Linebaugh and Rediker offered a new concept of pirates’ role in maritime trade. They put
forth the idea of devolution where by pirates began their maritime role serving the needs of the
maritime state and the merchant community from a top-down authority. When the devolution
reached the bottom, pirates organized a social world apart from merchants and imperialists and
attacked merchant property.10
Not only did Linebaugh and Rediker complicate pirates’ relationship with merchants but
they also recognized the role of Africans, both free and enslaved, working on board pirate ships,
which broadened the social scope of piracy. The authors built on Hugh Rankin’s point that a
substantial number of people who became pirates did not seem concerned about color
difference.11 In opposition to royal ships combining factory and prison features, Linebaugh and
Rediker argued that pirates built an autonomous, democratic, multiracial, social order at sea.
Linebaugh and Rediker linked slave rebellions with the ideas of maritime society, which helped
expand liberty with abolition in Haiti, France, Ireland, and England in the 1790s. These
conceptions of humanity, they argued, did not evolve in isolation but in solidarity and connection
within social movements and individuals. While the 1790s pushed back against expansive
meanings of what it meant to be human as racism and fear spread, resistance to these white-elitist
ideologies still remained among the waters.12 The authors’ connection of maritime life and
piracy to world revolutions brought life back into the field of piracy that had remained for the

9

Ibid., 144-149.
Ibid., 156-157.
11
Hugh F. Rankin, The Golden Age of Piracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969); cited in Linebaugh
and Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra, 165.
12
Ibid., 352.
10

6

most part stagnant in a discussion of the English Revolution, economics, and labor and initiated a
new wave of interest. Pirates now moved from one-dimensional figures who all had to represent
the same ideology to multi-dimensional figures who could represent numerous different
historical implications.
In 2001 C. R. Pennell edited a collected work of historians’ previously published research
on piracy. Pennell argued against the uniqueness of cruelty among pirates because the
seventeenth and eighteenth century they lived in was a violent world. He did not deny that some
pirates were “violent sadists” but questioned if this propaganda was directed at pirates or serving
writers’ own ends.13 Pennell’s introductory address of the problems which historians of piracy
faced refuted the previously held idea that all pirates consisted of rebels in an unequal social
order. To rectify this, Pennell urged scholars to try to understand this outsider society in its own
terms and not through comparison of conventional western society despite the difficulty the field
faced in achieving such an abstract analysis. While he acknowledged the historical issues, he
also addressed the problem of history as a profession and the increased demand to publish,
choosing quantity over quality, causing recurring mistakes in the work of piracy that held the
field back from making progress.14 For this reason, Pennell stated the need for a collective work
of some of the top publications that existed and began a collected effort for legitimizing the field.
Within Pennell’s collected work two historians, Rediker and Kinkor, focused on women
and Africans respectively in their two separate contributions. Both used the rejection of landed
society on sea as the opening for both groups to enter and be treated equally but how women and
Africans’ inclusion at sea came to exist differed. Kinkor found that as long as blacks had some
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acquaintance with European language, culture, or seamanship, they routinely joined pirate crews
as freemen. Pirates rejected the divisiveness of the colonies and recruited an international crew.
Pirates did not determine impressment based on color but on one’s courage to volunteer.
Kinkor’s discussion on shared feelings of marginality breaking down racial barriers pushed
against previous literature that argued that piracy viewed Africans as only servile. Instead, he
presented race as not static; in some unique situations, such as piracy, blacks had the right to
vote, were leaders of predominately white crews, and had an equal share to plunder based on
their skills.15 Rediker’s findings concerning women’s place among pirate ships were quite
different. In his analysis of Anne Bonny and Mary Read, the only two women to be convicted of
piracy during the eighteenth century, Rediker found that customary maritime practice that
forbade women to work on board typically withstood radical ideas of liberty and equality on
pirate ships. While part of this can be attributed to the lack of physical strength and stamina that
maritime life required of sailors, it was also rooted in gendered beliefs. Among sailors, a
widespread belief prevailed that women and sexuality were inimical to both work order and
social order on the ship. Despite the increased challenge women faced to be treated as equal on
board a pirate ship in comparison to Africans relative ease at finding equality, Rediker asserted
that through Bonny and Read women did find liberty under the Jolly Roger, although the
prospect remained rare.16
After the publication of the collected works on piracy, Rediker published his first book
that focused solely on pirates in 2004. His argument rested on the fact that ministers, royal
officials, and pirates all consciously used terror to accomplish their aims in the name of their
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social order. Not only did he present this new way of viewing the motives of government
sanctioned and unsanctioned, as Kinkor called for in his earlier contribution, but he divided the
broad Golden Age of piracy into three distinct generations of pirates. The first generation he
designated was from 1650-1680 and focused on buccaneers, which he defined as Protestant
seadogs of England, northern France, and the Netherlands. The second generation focused on
the 1690s and pirates in the Indian Ocean who built their base on Madagascar. The final
generation and the pirates Rediker chose to concentrate on covered a time span from 1716-1726,
which also marked the end of piracy.17 Rediker’s division of pirates based on chronology
allowed for a more simplified approach to the complex subject of piracy. Even though
simplification can be problematic in history, Rediker’s process of bringing motivations together
with the specific period of his focus, revealed the necessity of not viewing all pirates as the same,
under the same motives or consequences to their illicit practices. This brought out the need for
historians to analyze more deeply the relationship between landed society and the social
structures of piracy at sea creating a bridge connecting two entities predominately viewed as
entirely separate.
Rediker’s work not only differed from previous scholars’ works in his organization and
connection of accepted society with pirates’ society but also through emphasizing the importance
of the legacy of piracy over the reality. According to Rediker, pirates overall wanted a better
life, including freedom, equality, harmony, and abundance. For a short time, pirates managed to
make these ideals real. Contemporaries mistook this new order of rough but effective
egalitarianism as disorder. Rediker reminded readers though that one should be careful about
confusing official opinion with public opinion, as many people viewed pirates as the freest of
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mankind, not a vile group to do away with. In his discussion on Africans and women, Rediker
argued that while money did provide an incentive it was not their main reason for joining pirates.
He asserted most became pirates to seek a life under a new social order under different growing
assumptions.18 These assumptions directly influenced discourse about liberty during the
revolutionary period of the late-eighteenth century. The emphasis on legacy versus reality
extended the discussion of piracy beyond life on the water into larger ideological arguments that
developed during the eighteenth century.
As the interest in piracy grew, Atlantic history created a context in which to examine
piracy deeper. Even though Rediker and previous historians working on piracy touched on the
Atlantic discussion of piracy, Bernard Bailyn sounded the official call for historians to conduct
more work on the developing field of Atlantic history. The development of the Atlantic field
allowed piracy to emerge as a dynamic focus of study open to a broader group of historians,
further legitimizing a topic once believed to be outside the scope of academia. Unlike in his
earlier work on merchants, Bailyn did not mention piracy at all in his book, Atlantic History:
Concept and Contours, but he addressed themes that historians working on piracy have argued
the entire time. Bailyn defined Atlantic history as the story of the creation of a vast new
expansion of European civilization and conflict, using terms such as barbarous, savages, and
uncultivated to describe natives and colonists. He argued for historians to describe not abstract,
meta-historical structural elements within this imperial sphere but phasing of developments of
the Atlantic world, its motion and dynamics to further grasp history as a process. Before this
historical method could be achieved Bailyn warned of two limitations the field had to overcome:
The assumption that Atlantic history is a combination of several national histories and expansion
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overseas, and the assumption that formal, legal structures reflect reality. In an effort to
distinguish patterns in the multicultural history, he also advised against exaggerating those
patterns.19
Bailyn found within Atlantic history that the commercial economy so important to
settling the Americas was made possible through illegal trade. This trade helped bind the
widespread and intensely competitive Atlantic commercial world together because smuggling
bypassed formal, nationalistic constraints through providing foreign products into different
ports.20 Without mentioning piracy, this strong statement toward the importance of illicit trade
leaves historians unable to continue to ignore piracy as a relevant subject to larger historical
contexts. Bailyn furthered the necessity of discussing piracy with his emphasis on the ideas of
independence. These ideals, he argued, survived even if unrealized, ignored, or rejected, and
continued to unify cultures of the Atlantic world.21 Again, without mentioning piracy, Bailyn
created a link between the social distinction among pirates and their egalitarianism and the
importance of Atlantic history for discovering the underlying ideology that incited revolutions.
His address of these themes along with defining what Atlantic history helped legitimize the field
of piracy that until this point remained largely on the fringe of historical research despite other
scholars’ push to broaden the discussion. Now scholars had a way not only to utilize the
developing field of Atlantic history but also to legitimize their own analysis of piracy
In a collected work from 2009, Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan lent support to
Bailyn’s call for an Atlantic historical field not only with positive contributions concerning the
field but also with the critiques and hurdles the field faced. They opened their book with a
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usable definition of Atlantic history, more straightforward than Bailyn’s, stating that Atlantic
history is an “analytic construct and an explicit category of historical analysis that historians
have devised to help them organize the study of some of the most important developments of the
early modern era.”22 Within their work they addressed the five main critiques the field faced and
effectively countered each while also acknowledging the weaknesses the field faced in these
areas. Most important of the critiques was the sentiment that Atlantic history is merely imperial
history in a more acceptable guise. This Greene and Morgan refuted with the support of Bailyn’s
previous statement that Atlantic history is not imperial history, just the sum of imperial histories.
The authors also reasserted Bailyn’s warning not to exaggerate connections or contrasts when
utilizing this largely comparative approach. They recognized that different viewpoints highlight
different influences and developments within the Atlantic world and, due to this, extreme caution
must be utilized when analyzing trends between colonies and European imperialists.23
Unfortunately, the field of piracy remained unaddressed in their work as it was in
Bailyn’s. Yet, there are mentions scattered throughout that emphasize the need to look further
into the history of piracy and acts of piracy within the development of the Atlantic world.
Laurent Dubois’s contribution ignored pirates’ role in providing British North American
colonies’ goods illegally to the French Caribbean. He did argue, however, that the economic
result of illicit trade was pivotal for spurring the economy.24 Carla Rahn Phillips’s chapter
supported this statement with a slightly more detailed analysis of smuggled bullion in the
Atlantic world. Phillips found that while the total of smuggled bullion remains unknown some
scholars have discovered that 10% of European treasure was never registered. Other historians
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have estimated an even higher percentage. From this, she argued that smuggling proved a
pivotal part in the rise of the Atlantic economy and granted a large incentive with the added
bonus of avoiding taxes for contemporaries.25 Both of these accounts, while not directly calling
for research on piracy, revealed the importance of illicit trade and smuggling in the development
of the Atlantic economy and reasserted the indirect call Bailyn also issued for historians of
piracy to bring the field outside of only a discussion of radicals on water.
The same year that Greene and Morgan issued their call for a more serious approach to
Atlantic history and the legitimization of the field, Jon Latimer published his book which, more
than any other historians’ work discussed, brought together the events of the Caribbean with
those occurring in Europe. From this perspective, he also managed to bring together previous
historians’ work in a way that created a unique and compelling argument further legitimizing the
field of piracy. Latimer’s work focused on the rise of the buccaneers and their essential role in
the rise of Britain which coincided with the fall of Spain. Within his analysis, he differentiates
between pirates and buccaneers, one illegal and one sanctioned, despite their common motive of
plunder.26 Latimer added fifteen years to Haring’s designation of buccaneers becoming pirates
stating that 1697, not 1682, marked the end of buccaneering due to the Treaty of Rijswijk, which
recognized the French rights to the Caribbean and caused revolts on Madagascar.27 This also
fitted Marcus Rediker’s previous designations of generations of piracy and the devolution from
privateer to pirate.
Further, Latimer’s numbers, which previous historians failed to look into, which revealed
the profit buccaneers actually earned rather than the popular opinion of what their profits were
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shattered the idealized image other historians built of a democratic, idealized commonwealth on
the sea. Yet, one of the factors Latimer used to differentiate buccaneers from privateers did
include a strong democratic element in buccaneers’ command and reward structure. He did not
deny democracy existed among those at sea as opposed to landed society but argued that
scholars’ perception of pirates’ repeatedly egalitarian social structure was actually deeply flawed.
Most importantly, Latimer argued that buccaneers were equally concerned with raiding on shore
as they were at sea.28 No longer did raiders on board ships remain separate from land.
Mark Hanna significantly expanded upon the pirates’ shared existence on sea and on land
in his recently published book. His work finally fully dissolved the idea of pirates as separate
from society and brought them onto land as functioning, integral members of society who shaped
the very authority previous historians believed they rejected. This, in essence, finally realized in
full Christopher Hill’s earlier call to recognize pirates’ relationship with sociopolitical changes
instead of viewing them only as rebels who simply rejected society on land for a life at sea. In
his book, which is the most recent publication on piracy, Hanna focused on the symbiotic
relationship between marauders and colonial communities. This allowed him to highlight not
only pirates themselves but their importance in economic, legal, cultural, and political patterns of
development in early America and the British Empire. For Hanna, the support of piracy, or lack
thereof, largely masked complicated struggles over political power, the rule of law, and
oppressive market regulations within the empire.29 This departed from previous understandings
of sea-based marauding that viewed piracy as entirely separate from land. Previously, scholars
such as Kinkor and Rediker viewed pirates as detached from society, in rebellion with the norms
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and hierarchies established on land. Hanna countered this notion with the statement that “not
only simplifies notions of piracy at sea but also implies a homogenous society on land with
shared social values and economic depression.”30
Not only did Hanna view piracy’s relationship with land differently from previous
historians, but in contrast to Latimer, he asserted that the Royal African Company did not
suppress piracy. Instead, Hanna argued that it was actually the elimination of Britain’s
monopoly over trade through the East India Trading Company which led to piracy’s demise.
Using an imperial lens, Hanna found that without the East India Trading Company’s monopoly
over trade, North American colonists no longer needed pirates to supply limited or undersupplied
goods. Now merchants, along with legalized separate traders, could profit from trade on their
own with support from the crown making illicit trade less appealing.31 Ports that had once been
opened to pirates closed and executions without a jury were ordered. Where piracy once held
appeal due to its financial rewards, fewer men were willing to leave their families and search for
gold knowing that they would never be allowed to return to land and spend it. It was only when
authorities and society severed the land and sea connection of pirates that the nature of piracy
transformed. It was at this point that piracy transformed into the more popular image of fear and
betrayal which people hold today. By 1740, five captains, including Blackbeard, named their
ships Revenge and created an atmosphere of violence and terror which Rediker discussed
earlier.32 Hanna found that after 1740, piracy sustained itself only for a few more years until it
essentially disappeared, a few years later than the time that Rediker suggested in his work.
Hanna’s findings revealed a more complex, nuanced view not only of how the social climate and
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politics of land shaped piracy but how pirates responded to these changes and in turn shaped land
as well. His work highlighted the social exchange between land and sea that emphasized the
need for historians to use an imperial lens in order to quit denouncing pirates as irrelevant to
their own research. Hanna’s contribution finally made it impossible for scholars to ignore piracy
in the British Empire without facing critique.
Even though Hanna achieved bringing piracy into larger historical discussions, historians
conducting work in the field of piracy, including Hanna himself, largely continued to ignore the
reign of Henry VIII only discussing the impact of 1536. The field of piracy predominately
focuses on the “Golden Age” of piracy from the 1650s to the 1730s within the British Empire
and takes an Atlantic approach.33 Overall, scholars focusing on this period examine Henry
VIII’s contribution toward piracy only through his Statute of 1536. Unfortunately, this statute is
generally discussed only in the context of imperial England and not during the reign of Henry
VIII. Mark Hanna addresses Henry’s statute the most in his recently published book but still
fails to place it within its own historical context.34 Hanna emphasizes that, in contrast to
previous scholars’ claims, piracy was not separate from political or economic discussions on land
but in fact was an integral part of society which actively shaped government and trade
regulations. Although he rightly pushes to recognize the importance of piracy as early as
Elizabeth’s reign, Hanna fails to connect Henry’s statute, which laid the foundation for the
modern Admiralty law, with any significant issue of piracy prior to Elizabeth, which also
affected society on land and foreign relations. Other historians, such as Jon Latimer and David
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Starkey, mention Henry’s role in piracy briefly, but do not connect foreign correspondence and
complaints about piracy during Henry’s reign causing piratical acts to seem like random events
which lacked significant importance.35
The scholars who most recognize the impact of Henry VIII on piracy are historians
tracing not the development of piracy but the legal development of maritime law in general.
Alfred P. Rubin is recognized within the field as one of the most important contributors to
tracing this development.36 In his book, he outlines major legal appointments and statutes
authorized under Henry VIII, but since he focuses only on legal history, Rubin fails to recognize
any social or diplomatic significance within these developments. Instead he focuses on the
etymology of legal terms such as “piracy” and “pirates” but only within legal documents. As a
result, his work does not concentrate primarily on the significance of the contribution of each
monarch (or president as he gets into the modern era) but rather on the quantity of statutes and
acts which addressed piracy during their reigns. Rubin spends more time on Henry VIII than
other scholars have, yet even he dedicated no more than a few pages to tracing piracy under his
rule.
Despite the lack of discussion of Henry VIII within the history of piracy, historians in
more general fields such as history of religion, England, and trade are beginning to discuss
piracy’s effect on different areas of study. This trend is important for the growth of the field
because it brings piracy into a broader discussion, which emphasizes the importance in studying
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piracy to reveal deeper, underlying causes of conflict between monarchs, diplomats, and
merchants. One work which historians still widely refer to despite its age, is Gordon ConnellSmith’s Forerunners of Drake: A Study of English trade with Spain in the early Tudor Period.
Through the prism of trade, Smith’s book from 1954 traces the rise of piracy within merchant
circles, particularly focusing on two encounters which involved the English, Spanish, Portuguese
and French in 1525 and 1545.37 Peter Marshall also discusses encounters with English, Spanish,
Portuguese and French ships but does not discuss piracy. Instead he focuses on how merchants
and religious turmoil came together to shape each other as Spanish and English tensions
escalated once Henry declared the Act of Supremacy in 1534. He very briefly mentions the
culmination of these two factors in a conflict in 1539 between English and French ships
anchored in Lisbon with Biscayans helping the French despite their own tensions.38 While
Marshall does not identify this conflict as piracy, he does cite Smith’s work which did view the
encounter as merchants acting in piratical ways. Marshall’s brief foray into this conflict,
however, does prove the necessity of considering the ways piracy could be interpreted and of not
dismissing acts as simply mercantile conflicts. Overall, the works of Smith and even of Marshall,
who did not focuse on piracy at all, provide insightful evidence for agents acting outside of the
authority of the crown against maritime law and treaties which directly affected foreign
relations.39 This also expands the traditional focus of Henrician scholars from religious tension
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inside England to outside forces, including acts of piracy, heightening that tension which altered
European relations.40
In contrast to these scholars who do not spend much time on Henry VIII and his relations
with piracy, I argue that Henry’s reign was pivotal for the legal development of piracy that
would carry on into the reigns of subsequent English monarchs, including Elizabeth I. Not only
did Henry pass the Acts of 1535 and 1536, the acts most scholars focus on, which created a
special court for prosecuting piracy, but he also forever altered the crown’s relationship with
privateering through his public decree that he would use privateers in naval battles against the
French. Henry’s judicial contributions on prosecuting piracy, as well as the crown’s relationship
to piracy, can be seen to be repeated throughout Edward VI, Mary I, and Elizabeth I’s reigns.
All subsequent Tudor monarch’s own decrees toward piracy and privateering, if they did not use
the exact wording, heavily reflected their father’s decrees in the early sixteenth century. The
final case study of Friar Bernardine, a French admiral who the English considered a pirate,
reveals the extent to which Henry contributed to the defining, and therefore treatment, of piracy
at sea during his reign. The examination of Henry’s contribution to piracy not only sheds new
light on the history of pirates in the Henrician era, but also causes a new, complex view of Henry
VIII’s reign to emerge. Henry was best known for his wives and the creation of the Anglican
Church, but new studies on diplomatic strategies and naval tactics can grant new insight to
England as separate and distinct from the rest of Europe.
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CHAPTER 1
DIPLOMACY OF PIRATES:
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND CHANGES IN THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF PIRACY
UNDER HENRY VIII

Early modern Europe witnessed the rise of piracy as a monarchical tool in diplomacy and
warfare. During the early sixteenth century, Barbary corsairs grew influential under the Ottoman
Empire but England, France, and Spain also increasingly legalized their relationship with and
against piracy. For the purpose of this work, piracy involved any act of robbery or smuggling at
sea, sometimes combined with violence, orchestrated either independently of or in accordance
with a crown. In 1510, the treaty between France and England emphasized the need for the
monarchs to work together in order to limit piracy on the sea. Within the treaty, as with the
Treaty of London in 1518, negotiators viewed piracy as entirely independent of and perhaps even
hostile to the crowns. Monarchs viewed joint prosecution of piracy as a way to strengthen their
alliance. After Henry VIII issued the Statutes of 1535 and 1536 which developed the Court of
Admiralty, one can detect a decisive shift in the accountability to which monarchs held each
other in prosecuting and preventing acts of piracy against neighboring realms. Now piracy
threatened to break alliances due to the increasing view that the English monarch was
responsible for prosecuting subjects acting illicitly. Another major shift occurred in 1544 when
Henry VIII declared England would use privateers, or crown-authorized pirates, as a naval

20

maneuver in war against the French. This move, as with 1536, from the English monarch
completely altered once again how Europeans perceived the relationship between pirates and the
crown. Tracing the development of piracy under Henry VIII is necessary in furthering one’s
understanding not only of piracy throughout the British Empire but also of the influences and
meanings behind foreign relations and diplomatic developments of the early sixteenth century
Europe. This paper seeks to examine not only the pivotal moment of 1536 that previous scholars
have recognized but to argue that Henry’s reign saw much more in the legal development of
piracy than only one act.
Henry VIII’s treaty with Louis XII, King of France, created the first major discussion and
working definition of piracy in foreign relations during his reign. This treaty did not expect
monarchs to prosecute their own subjects committing piracy under their own unique laws but to
work collectively to rid the sea of piratical acts. The treaty was drafted on March 23, 1509 and
then ratified and confirmed by Pope Julius II on March 23, 1510. While the treaty addressed
disputes involved in the War of the League of Cambrai, it largely focused on England and France
agreeing to prosecute acts of piracy within each of their realms and to work together when
prosecuting these acts. Article 7 of the treaty comprised the largest portion of the overall
document. This article consisted of six sentences in comparison to the articles negotiating
general peace terms which consisted of only one sentence each. This article designated that the
kings of England and France could not place armed soldiers in the specific towns of Calais, Ham,
and Guines in English territory and Boulogne and Fiennes in France in addition to any other
place under the crowns’ authority in order to “perpetrate acts of robbery or piracy.”
Additionally, the treaty addressed how to handle these acts legally, stating that if “subjects of one
of the contracting parties attack and rob subjects of the other contracting prince, by sea or land,
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full reparation is to be given.”41 Connecting these two statements is important in understanding
how contemporaries defined the concept of piracy before England created its own definition in
1536 which defined piracy more clearly and specifically. Using the term “piracy” specifically
and describing the act as attacking and robbing gave both participating monarchs a way to accuse
foreign vessels and subjects of piracy within a specific parameter. The definition of piracy
which the treaty outlined did not specify the terms of piracy when acting under the authority of
the crown, such as privateering that grew under Elizabeth’s reign. Instead, it described soldiers
sent by a king participating in acts of robbery at land and sea. Despite the recognition that these
piratical acts could be carried out by soldiers serving the crown, such acts were not viewed as a
direct attack by the opposing crown that necessitated a declaration of war. Instead, the kings
were expected to grant reparations peacefully for the action of their subjects against the offended
country without any accusations of a calculated attack from the crown itself. By separating
piracy from the crown, this simple definition acted to unite monarchs in their efforts to reduce
piracy through joint prosecution instead of separating acts of piracy into legal jurisdictions which
held each country responsible for acts of piracy committed within their realm and by their
subjects.
Further exemplifying this point was the responsibility, or lack thereof, of all monarchs to
prosecute piracy that had been perpetrated in their own realm by a foreign crown’s subjects.
Article 7 clearly stated, “If a subject or subjects of one of the contracting princes is or are
arrested by armed subjects of the other prince, and the case is not clear enough to be decided
summarily, the conservators of this treaty will inquire into it, and set the arrested persons at
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liberty as soon as sufficient security is given for them.”42 This statement emphasized the need
for an indisputable criminal act deemed as piracy to occur for the involvement of direct
participants of the treaty in arrests. When the act of piracy was not clear, not only was the
possible offender typically set free but in order to preserve peace between England and France,
the case was removed from the two monarchs’ authority and into the conservators of the treaty.
Not only did the monarchs avoid rising tensions, but they now moved piracy into a European
scope.43 Additionally, neither England or France could issue letters of marque and reprisal,
government licenses which authorized the attack and capture of enemy ships, against either party
except “against great and notorious criminals, or in the case of open denial of justice.” Due to
this, the ability to restrict trade or to close sea routes against the other kingdom became a
difficult diplomatic tool to use. The treaty’s emphasis on notorious criminals rather than the
crown’s faithful subjects further separated acts of piracy from the monarch and created a
unifying factor for which both kingdoms could prosecute together. The discussion of open
denial of justice allowed for recognizing that a monarch could err in upholding the law but it still
did not recognize piracy as a tool the crown itself was using or as an act that the crown was
responsible for. Rather, it placed judicial treatment of piracy as the English and French crown’s
priority. The failure to prosecute piratical acts when necessary did not deem the crowns as
supporting piracy but simply as failing in their sovereign duties to uphold the law. The emphasis
on uniting the two monarchs in efforts against piracy reveals the tension that pirates helped shape
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between England and France that would continue throughout Henry VIII’s reign.44 Even more
importantly, the articles concerning piracy in the Treaty of 1510 brought the two monarchs
together to address piracy under the same rules and expectations. It did not view each monarch
as independently responsible for controlling piracy among his own subjects under their own
unique laws.
To emphasize further the European scope of piracy on foreign relations beyond England,
one can examine a letter from Scotland to Portugal. On June 24, 1511, James IV wrote to the
Procurator of the King of Portugal at Antwerp, and stated, “The Scotch complain, not of a
private Portuguese ship, but of the Portuguese fleet, which sailed for the purpose from Sluys and
gratuitously robbed certain Scotchmen, cruelly slaughtering others—an act denounced by the
senate of Burgundy. . . . Scotland. . . will send commissioners to Bruges to settle the affair.”45
The term “fleet” illuminated the fact that acts of piracy against foreign lands did not just happen
sporadically from independent agents acting outside of their monarch’s authority. An entire
Portuguese fleet robbed and slaughtered these Scots. Whether the Portuguese monarch
orchestrated this attack or, due to lack of control over his own fleets, the Portuguese crews came
together under their own volition cannot be inferred from this document. What can be
concluded, however, is that acts of piracy, even if possibly authorized in the form of
privateering, or legally sponsored piracy, caused major strife in European relations which
repeatedly led to outside forces negotiating between two kingdoms to arrange a settlement. Not
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only did Henry VIII and Louis XII create a treaty focusing on piracy, but James IV and Manuel I
of Portugal also had to include outside powers to negotiate peace terms involving piracy. The
focus on uniting European leaders against piracy also sought to preclude the possibility for a
monarch to attack an enemy country and then deny involvement in the piracy. This would
change after 1535 and 1536.
The appointment of John Hopton on October 20, 1511 to command a squadron against
pirates further contributed to the legal development of piracy under Henry VIII. The necessity of
Hopton’s appointment reflected the growing extent of piratical activities in Europe during the
early sixteenth century.46 As with the 1510 treaty between England and France, Henry’s use of
the term piracy denoted a developing sense of how to label sea marauding in a legal sense
despite the lack of a precise legal definition. Henry further addressed why Hopton’s new
position had become necessary revealing a couple of interesting concerns regarding piracy
during this time. The appointment stated, “upon the relation of some of our lieges we are
informed that many spoilers, pirates, exiles, and outlaws, arrayed in warlike fashion on the sea”,
England sought to reduce the attacks from pirates with Hopton as commander of the enterprise.47
The first thing one notices from this is the description of pirates ordering themselves in warlike
fashion, which reflected the complaints of James IV four months earlier. This strengthens the
interpretation that James’s letter referred to what foreign countries viewed as an act of piracy
rather than a direct attack from a foreign king. More importantly, Hopton’s appointment
signified that these orchestrated piratical attacks happened frequently enough in 1511 that an
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English monarch felt the need to address the situation despite his current alliance with Spain and
the Holy Roman Empire against France and Scotland, where attacks had apparently occurred.
From the accounts of piracy and the appointment of John Hopton, combined with larger
historical understanding of shifting alliances, it becomes clear that the similarities between
Henry’s description of pirates arranging in a warlike fashion and James’s earlier complaint
concerning the Portuguese fleet committing acts of piracy did not equate the English monarch’s
actions to the attack of the Portuguese fleet. Due to the discord between England and Scotland,
the occurrences of pirates using warlike tactics or naval fleets committing acts of piracy had to
be more numerous than just a singular attack against Scotland to cause Henry to act. By 1511,
the English and French Treaty of 1510 had diminished and renewed tensions emerged between
the two kingdoms. Significantly, the French and Scots were allies from the Auld Alliance, also
known as the Vieille Alliance, created in 1295. This alliance significantly affected Scots, French,
and English relations. Due to the increasing tension between England and France and Scotland’s
alliance with the French, it is hard to believe that Henry VIII would have felt any compulsory
need to defend the Scottish against piracy by appointing an English commander. From this, one
can discern that Henry VIII did not appoint John Hopton as commander in response to the
Scottish plight but rather to other occurrences which directly affected the English. This reveals
how rapidly piracy was growing and involving itself in foreign affairs between European
countries.
As foreign relations between England and France deteriorated, piracy increasingly
became an issue for the two kingdoms. In Under the Bloody Flag: Pirates of the Tudor Age,
John Appleby discusses English and French commissioners appointed in 1517 to resolve disputes
over piracy in Calais and Boulogne, which signified how problematic piracy had become for
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merchants trying to conduct trade.48 The next year, in 1518, Thomas Wolsey oversaw the Treaty
of London, which sought to unify European relations against threats from the east. A few
historians have pointed to this document as addressing piracy within the European sphere.49
Appleby further recognizes that despite the treaty’s desired unification of European countries,
piracy remained a divisive issue between England and France.50 While the language does not
directly refer to piracy within the document—and certainly piracy was not the focus—it remains
important to look at this treaty due to the emphasis on monarchs’ uniting against any acts outside
of the kings’ authority. Unlike previous documents there was a decisive shift in the focus on the
consequences facing monarchs when they violated the treaty. While peaceful relations remained
the principal desire, the treaty revealed that the crowns assumed responsibility for the actions of
their subjects. In contrast, the section of the treaty concerning the actions of rebels, a term used
commonly to refer to pirates since contemporaries viewed them as enemies of the crown,
emphasized that these acts did not merit as acts of war even if attacking foreign property or
possessions since these men were not acting under orders of the crown. Instead of becoming a
reason to openly attack foreign kingdoms, the actions of rebels called for monarchs to quietly
work together to confiscate rebels committing crimes within a monarch’s own dominion and to
then turn those rebels over to their own sovereign for punishment.
In contrast to dealing with rebels, Articles 2 and 3 emphasized the requirement of
contracting parties involved in the treaty to wage war against any country that attacked any other
member of the league. At first the attacked kingdom or dominion had to request formally,
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through ambassadors, that the offending country desist all further aggression. If the aggressive
acts continued, then “all the other confederates are bound to declare war with the aggressor or
aggressors within one month after being summoned to do so. Within two months after the
declaration of war, they are to begin actual hostilities by attacking or invading the dominions of
the aggressor or aggressors with an army strong enough to conquer the enemy.”51 If the
aggressor possessed land in the French, Spanish, English, or Baltic seas, then “the Kings of
France, of Spain, and of England are bound to make war upon him, not only by land but also by
sea. The fleets sent are to be so numerous, and so well provided with men, guns, and all other
engines of war, as to be sufficiently strong to attack and conquer the fleets or armies of the
enemy.”52 This language clearly viewed monarchs as responsible in aiding other allied countries
under attack from other monarchs involved in the peace negotiations of 1518. A kingdom
deserved peace only so long as it upheld peace itself.
Article 9’s language concerning rebels differed drastically. In Article 9, the last article of
the treaty, was the only one to address any sense of piracy within one’s own realm. The article
stated, “None of the contracting parties, or of those who are included in this treaty, are to permit
the rebels and traitors of any other of the contracting parties, or of their confederates, to stay in
their territories, nor are they and their subjects to assist and to aid them. When required to do so,
each of the contracting parties is to deliver the rebels found in his dominions, within 20 days, to
the other contracting party who claims them as his subjects.”53 Significantly, there was no
mention of a king’s participation or responsibility to intervene personally in any act of piracy
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performed by foreign subjects as the treaty established in Articles 2 and 3 concerning definite
attacks from another country. One can discern from this differentiation in treatment toward an
authorized attack from a monarch and acts of piracy that, despite the tension piracy caused
between kingdoms, especially the French and English, acts of piracy legally remained separate
from the sovereign. Monarchs still had not established legal jurisdiction and procedures for
prosecuting piracy so they could not be held responsible for crimes that pirates committed. This
interpretation can be further strengthened through examining the usage of “rebel” in the treaty.
Rebel, an umbrella term for any enemy of the crown, included pirates. The treaty did not address
the possibility of monarchs working alongside and utilizing piracy to their own ends; rather, it
concerned pirates who worked against the crown, and it prescribed alliances of different realms
to work together to prosecute piracy.
Throughout the 1520s, piracy continued to create tension among the French, Scots, and
English.54 In 1535, Henry created a statute addressing piracy that historians commonly overlook
in order to focus on the more influential Statute of 1536. While 1536 undeniably had a longerlasting impact, it remains pivotal to examine 1535 to understand further the necessity that led to
the creation only a year later of a revised statute aimed directly at piracy. The Act of 1535 For
pirates and robbers on the sea began with a preamble clearly identifying the issues that arose
with prosecuting piracy in admiral courts:
Where pirates, thieves, robbers, and murderers upon the sea, many times escape
unpunished, because the trial of their offences both heretofore been ordered before the
admiral, or his lieutenant or commissary, after the course of the civil laws, the nature
whereof is, that before any judgment of death can be given against the offenders, either
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they must plainly confess their offence. . . or else their offenses be so plainly and directly
proved by witnesses indifferent, such as saw their offenses committed.55
Clearly stated in the preamble is the issue of commuting a death sentence onto pirates due to the
difficulty of obtaining a necessary confession or eye-witness account.
In the outline of changes in the judicial treatment of piracy, several important points are
made. One of the most significant points, and one that continued to be addressed in the
following Act of 1536, was that acts of piracy were to be treated just as crimes of murder and
theft on land were prosecuted. Further, a confession was no longer necessary to sentence an
accused pirate to death. Instead, courts could announce a verdict based on evidence and
testimonies with or without the actual statement from the accused that they did commit the
crimes that they were on trial for. Problematically, this does not address the problem of pirates’
incentive to murder witnesses as the preamble itself recognized. In addition to changes in how
trials were handled the act recognized that sometimes acts of piracy had to be committed out of
necessity, as Rubin points out in his analysis of the Act of 1535. It followed that these acts could
not bring harm to anyone and must be repaid within a certain time frame: four months if done on
the European side of the Strait of Marrok (now known as the Strait of Gibraltar), twelve months
if done on the African side. There was no mention of the Atlantic, and it is not clear if this act
applied only to English pirates or to acts of piracy in general.
Clearly increasing tension between kingdoms and pirates led Henry VIII to revise the Act
of 1535 and to create a new act in 1536 entitled, An Act for punishment of Pirates and Robbers of
the Sea. The creation of the Act of 1536 marked a pivotal transition for how acts of piracy were
defined and how courts handled trials of piracy. As discussed earlier concerning the Act of
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1535, Mark G. Hanna points out in his work that prior to 1536, pirates could be convicted only
through confession or the legal testimony of witnesses, which encouraged pirates to murder their
victims in order to eliminate potential witnesses. Even more important, something as substantial
as a stolen ship could not be used as evidence in vice-admiralty courts. Henry’s act addressed
these issues with the continued use of civil law but also the return of common law and popular
use of a jury that could use a ship as evidence of piracy. Significantly, for the purposes of the
present analysis, Hanna pointed out that pirates had to be tried in special courts of oyer and
terminer “commissioned by the crown, but with a jury that accepted circumstantial evidence.”56
The commission of the crown signified a dramatic shift in the relationship between
monarchs and piracy; previously, monarchs worked together to abolish piracy, whereas now the
English king was alone directly responsible for prosecuting pirates in his realm. The language of
the statute which Henry issued presented a stark difference from the language of treaties
previously discussed. The statute of 1536 stated,
. . .all treasons, felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies, hereafter to be committed
in or upon the sea, or in any other haven, river, creek, or place where the Admiral or
Admirals have or pretend to have power, authority, or jurisdiction, shall be enquired,
tried, heard, determined, and judged in such shires and places in the realm as shall be
limited by the King’s commission. . . . And such commissions shall be had under the
King’s great seal directed to the Admiral or Admirals.57
Now piracy became an act that the English monarch was directly responsible for prosecuting.
Not only did it specify the role of the king but it created a distinction between English acts of
piracy and pirates outside of the English realm through the designation of prosecuting pirates
within the appointed Admiral’s jurisdiction. Previously, the Act of 1535 only stated the right to
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prosecute “upon the sea. . . river or creek where the admiral or admirals pretend to have
jurisdiction.”58 The Act of 1536 saw a decisive change in language as the Admirals no longer
had to “pretend” to have jurisdiction, a situation that weakened any claim to jurisdiction that they
had. Now, without the term “pretend” the Admirals’ power to hold trials increased. While legal
jurisdiction at sea granted the crown more authority to prosecute piracy, it also granted other
monarchs the ability to hold the English crown responsible for English piracy against their own
ships. Now, other ruling monarchs could label piracy as English and, therefore, view the English
monarch as complicit in piracy which it did not seek to actively prosecute. Since the Act of 1536
made England responsible for the prosecution of English pirates, if the English crown ignored
piracy within his realm or pirates identified as English, other monarchs could now claim the king
allied himself with pirates and sought to help them in attacks on foreign vessels. The Act
allowed a way for England to prosecute piracy, but it also diminished the ability to deny
involvement in piracy as an effective way to negate responsibility for pirates’ behavior against
other countries. Piracy effectively had taken on new connotations of foreign diplomacy. Instead
of a tool to unite realms and strengthen alliances, pirates became a way to justify attacks and to
assert a king’s unwillingness to act in accordance to his own law.
Despite creating a clear legal process to prosecute piracy, the Statute of 1536 did not
clear up the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the legislation. As Alfred Rubin points out,
whereas the Statute of 1535 addressed the issue of necessary piracy with the Strait of Marrok as
a demarcation line, the Statute of 1536 ignored any mention of juridical boundaries. The
vagueness of where Admirals were responsible for prosecuting piracy created confusion among
the English and their European neighbors. As discussed above, Rubin recognizes that authority
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was restricted to places where the Admiral had jurisdiction under the law of England, but he
argues that it was never clear whether it extended to foreign vessels on the high seas or on
internal navigable waters of England which fell under the Courts of Common Law, not the
Admiralty.59 J. R. Tanner also recognizes that under the statute, even the coast of England
became a point of confusion for the jurisdiction of different courts. Under the Act of 1536 the
criminal jurisdiction of the Admiralty came to be exercised under the supervision of the Judges
of the Courts of Common Law and had to act in accordance to these laws. This created the
curious problem of coastal jurisdiction which fell under the Courts of Common Law when the
tide was out and the Court of the Admiralty when the tide was in.60 As both Rubin and Hanna
recognized, the courts did not address the problem of foreign vessels at sea. English courts did
not alter the legislation to state positively that it extended to foreign vessels outside of England’s
Common Law jurisdiction until the case of Regina v. Keyn in 1876.61
Hanna also discovered a loophole of the Statute which provided the foundation for his
overall argument that the legal status of individuals on land directly fostered the proliferation of
piracy at sea. For their accomplices to be deemed guilty, the pirates themselves first had to be
found guilty regardless of any incriminating evidence against the accomplice that the court
already held. Even further, if two crimes took place in two different jurisdictions, such as land
and sea, Admiralty courts could not try accessories to the crime if their crime took place on land.
While one might assume this placed the crime into Common Law Courts, that would be
incorrect. Courts of Common Law could not try accessories to crimes of piracy either, because
only the Courts of Admiralty could try principals of the crimes.62 Despite the problem of unclear
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jurisdictions and the question of how to prosecute accomplices effectively, the Statute of Henry
VIII continued to be used and referred to without much question until the 1700 Piracy Act.63
The tremendous significance of this act to determine 160 years of legal precedent cannot be
ignored. This fact alone, even without the shift it caused in foreign relations involved in
handling piracy, demands a closer examination of the development of piracy under Henry VIII
than has been presently given.
After 1536, piracy took on a new role within Europe. The very same year that Henry
VIII passed the act, Eustace Chapuys, the Holy Roman Imperial Ambassador at the English
court, wrote to Charles V concerning a meeting with Henry VIII alongside the French
ambassador, Jean de Dinteville. Henry expected both ambassadors to explain acts that defied
previous treaties and to defend their monarchs. Dinteville was granted the right to speak first
and immediately began defending France, stating that his sovereign had not committed any acts
that broke the treaty. Dinteville went on to state that despite France not breaking the treaty,
Charles V had invaded French territory “without regard to treaties or relationship.”64
Significantly, Dinteville asserted that Charles V had broken the treaty because some of his
subjects, not naval commanders, seized a French ship at Aigues Mortes. This is important
because it shows an immediate use and response to the new Act that Henry VIII had passed,
which created the link between piratical acts and the sovereign. The problem with Dinteville’s
assertion of a ship being taken by subjects not under a sovereign’s direct command is that the
Act addressed only piracy within England; it did not apply to all of Europe. Chapuys, aware of
this, addressed Thomas Cromwell who claimed ignorance of any rumors of a French ship being
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seized and stated that had the Emperor participated in any of the alleged transgressions around
Provence, he would only have been invading and taking his own property.65 Even though
Cromwell ignored Dinteville’s insistence that the Emperor had acted outside of treaties, any
insinuation of utilizing acts of piracy now had to be justified as emphasized by Cromwell’s
insistence that Dinteville’s complaint was irrelevant since the territory was under Charles V’s
authority. Cromwell did not defend Charles by arguing that these acts happened outside of
imperial land but that they took place within the crown’s own property. After Chapuys’ letter to
Charles, Cromwell wrote Chapuys the next month complaining that he “has been informed that
the Emperor’s subjects in the Netherlands rob and maltreat the English, especially by sea…. [He]
begs him to write for redress in order that the friendship of the King and the Emperor may not
cool.”66 The degree of the willingness of the Emperor to control piratical acts against
Englishmen could now determine the political relationship between the two rulers.
Pirates themselves soon became aware of the power that treaties gave them as well as the
power they had to affect alliances created by treaties. The fact that their crimes were under the
crown’s jurisdiction created a stronger incentive to prosecute piracy but also gave pirates a way
to threaten and negotiate with monarchs. On February 6, 1539, Lord Lisle of Calais, who was
Arthur Plantagenet, the son of Edward IV, wrote to Adrian Revel, a good friend and Captain of
the Dieppe, warning him that “of late from the River of Thames, which runneth by. . . an English
pirate with a galleon. . . which is an entirely new ship and hath long time. . . been equipped for as
for war. . . and that aboard of this said pirate there are thirty fellows, and that their intention is to
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go to sea in order to pillage and harm the allies and friends of the King.”67 Lord Lisle continued
to request that Revel apprehend these pirates if he knew of their location or grant Lisle the
knowledge so that he could acquire the means to garner their apprehension himself. One can
derive from this letter that pirates set off with a clear agenda of which the motives cannot be
discerned. What can be observed is that the pirates did not set out to attack English ships or
enemies of the English crown. From this one can deduct that the pirates described in Lord
Lisle’s letter attacked allies for an unknown reason with the knowledge that if England did not
apprehend and prosecute them, it could damage any relationship the crown had with other
monarchs. It goes without saying that they did not intend to be apprehended. If this does not
reveal active agency in disrupting treaties, it does indicate the strategic attack specifically on
allies of pirates’ knowledge of their own power. They could not attack an English ship but they
also would not aid the English in attacking foreign enemies. These pirates were not privateers,
unlike those attacking the Scots, yet the willingness to prosecute still held the key for upholding
political alliances in both cases despite different the relationships between the monarchs and
pirates.
The next year, October 12, 1540, Charles V wrote to James V of Scotland that he
“Requires him to do justice in the case of certain fishermen of Ostend who have been robbed by
Robert Fogo, a Scottish pirate, as appears by certificate enclosed.”68 The letter made clear that a
letter of reprisal for the pirate from the Scottish crown was found and that the act, or lack, of
prosecution would determine the outcome of the situation. James V responded to the complaint
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by denying the piracy of Robert Fogo was authorized by the Scottish crown. Instead James
asserted that he arrested Fogo immediately upon his return and “Will do nothing contrary to the
amity renewed between them a few years ago,” in reference to the renewal in 1529 of the
commercial treaty between Scotland and the Netherlands.69 James’ response exemplifies the
new nuanced structure of piracy in diplomatic relations. Previously, James was able to complain
about the King of Portugal’s hand in piracy only because it was Portuguese commanders and
naval men acting in piratical ways. These were quite clearly men under the crown’s orders who
questionably acted outside of those orders or in secret with the crown to conduct acts of piracy.
No letters of marque or reprisal were involved. Now, in 1539, James was able to deny aiding in
piracy against another kingdom with the defense that he prosecuted the very pirate Charles V
complained about despite clear evidence stating otherwise. This shows again the shift seen after
1536 whereby the ability to accuse a monarch of working with pirates depended entirely on their
ability to prosecute piracy. Steven Murdoch, who wrote on Scottish maritime warfare, asserts
that it was quite clear for all contemporaries involved that James V did in fact work with Fogo.
Murdoch points out that Fogo worked not only under letters of general reprisal from the previous
year but that James V specifically listed Fogo’s name in the letters. He also found that despite
this, James’s quick act of justice determined the outcome of the affair and its effect on any
outstanding treaties.70
Further representing the change in attitude toward piracy is the Rochepot Affair that
Thomas Cromwell was accused of being involved with in 1540, the year of his death. The
Rochepot Affair began in 1537, the year after Henry VIII’s act against piracy was passed, with a
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skirmish between German merchants and French ships in the English Channel. The French ships
sailed under letters of marque and reprisal to Rochepot whose brother, Anne de Montmorency,
was a constable of France. Soon after the French murdered many on board and took the ship,
English ships set sail after the prize ship the French had taken. The dispute became more
complicated when the French claimed the Germans had contraband on board, allowing them to
attack the ship, a claim which the Germans denied having any knowledge of. England then
denied a remittal of the trial to a French court due to the statute 27 Edward III, cap. 13 which
served as an alliance between the Hanseatic League and England. The Germans were allowed to
pick the place in England where the trial would be held.71 This trial became even more
complicated when one remembers the Act of 1536 which did not clarify how to handle
prosecutions involving foreign vessels. For all purposes the English were not involved in this
affair beyond the fact that it occurred in their waters so the logical solution would have been to
remit the trial to France, amplifying the animosity the French felt toward England when it denied
them that right.
The case seems to fade from record until Cromwell, who had in the meantime been
preoccupied with Bibles, wrote letters to both Edmund Bonner, the Bishop of London, and Anne
de Montmorency, Rochepot’s brother, in 1539 concerning the affair.72 In the letter to Bonner he
reiterated that the trial could not be moved to France and claimed that the allegations of the
French ambassador and Monsieur de Dampont’s, a French gentleman, about prolonging the case
of Rochepot were false.73 Cromwell’s letter to Montmorency, on the other hand, expressed an
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apologetic tone toward the circumstances which denied the return of the case to a French court.
Cromwell’s tone in his letter to Montmorency contrasted his tone used in his letter to Bonner
which portrayed only distrust of the French. To Montmorency, Cromwell claimed that if he
could he would use the small power that he had with the king, Henry, to help push the affair in
the French favor in order to have the ship, still held by the English, returned to its rightful owner
in France.74 In December, less than six months later, Cromwell wrote Montmorency again but
this time urged him to appeal to his brother Rochepot to accept the offers of Henry VIII.75 These
differing sentiments led to the accusation in 1540 that Cromwell actively worked to prolong the
trial for his own personal benefit. The Lords of the Council asserted that Cromwell had been
promised part of the prize from the attack on the German ship by the French in 1537. In a letter
addressed to Council, Cromwell denied any such involvement stating, “but that ever I hade any
partte of that pryse or that I wer promyssyd Any part theroff my lordes assure yourselffes I was
not.”76 This plea was sent out four days before Cromwell’s execution. In only four years, piracy
shifted from a crime that required the Act of 1536 to assure death for those who committed
crimes at sea to a crime that became a legitimate reason to condemn a high official to death who
never touched the ship involved. Acts of piracy were no longer separate from land.
In 1544, piracy took on an entirely new role in England. Henry granted blanket
authorization for privateering in an act of war against the French, as Janice Thomason found in
her study of longue durée of piracy and state-building.77 This grant did not require privateers to
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obtain a license nor did it grant security but called for them to attack any French ship that they
spotted. Once piracy fell under legal jurisdiction of the English crown as a crime after 1536, a
new opportunity for monarchs to issue decrees legalizing piracy for their own advantages arose.
If one had the authority to deem an act illegal, one also had the authority to declare it legal under
certain circumstances. This was just what Henry did at a time of war, and the need for more
ships than his navy could provide forced him to find a supply elsewhere: among pirates. Now
pirates played the role of essentially mercenaries at sea for the crown. Instead of denying
granting any authority to acts of piracy as James V did with Charles V only five years earlier,
Henry asserted not only his right to command the pirates under English jurisdiction but to use
them in waging war against another kingdom. The question remains, though, why would pirates
want to work with the crown when they could acquire prizes and loot on their own as they had
already been doing? Henry VIII provided incentive with his statement that “they were to have
the whole property in the prizes which they took, without any bonus for the Lord High Admiral
or the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports.”78 Not only did pirates now have sanction from royal
authority to attack French ships, but they got to keep the entirety of their prizes. In short, the
Lord Admiral no longer could prosecute them for acts against the French. Without the threat of
prosecution, pirates no longer had to worry whether they would be able to enjoy their loot.
Importantly, Henry did not require a percentage of their prizes in return for sanctioning their
piratical acts under the crown. Previously, smaller, local uses of privateering required privateers
to share their prizes with a host of public officials. The decline of privateers contributing their
men and services to the navy was due to privateers’ accomplishments, which favored the rise of
the navy rather than privateers’ own advancement. The decline in their naval participation
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necessitated the need for Henry to make clear that fighting for the crown benefitted privateers’
before it benefitted the navy.79 From this one can discern not only the weakness of the royal
navy but the strength of privateers. The crown clearly recognized this strength and found that
the predicted guarantee of defeating the French with the privateers’ help far outweighed any
negotiations of monetary gain. This finding is profound under a monarch whose treasury was
known for being in debt.
The shift of piracy as completely separate from the crown in 1509 when the treaty
between Henry VIII and Louis XII was drafted, to the English crown’s sanctioning of piracy in
warfare against the French establishes the magnitude of how piracy shaped foreign alliance and
vice versa. Privateering became renowned under Elizabeth I with Francis Drake, but historians
continue to ignore Henry’s use of privateering. His reign witnessed the transformation from
monarchs denying any association with piracy to publically proclaiming affiliation with pirates
in matters of war. Incidents involving Scotland, Portugal, Spain, France and other kingdoms
served as examples of how crowns viewed piracy as a secret tool which one must plausibly deny
or at least appear to prosecute to keep peace. From these occurrences, England steadily broke
away from this trend along with France as privateering became an increasingly useful tool in
warfare. At this moment piracy quit being a nuisance to monarchs that united rulers in an effort
to eradicate the practice and instead became an illegal entity that a monarch united with at times
of necessity to defeat enemy countries causing a further divide among foreign alliances. These
developments during the reign of Henry VIII later caused significant trouble under the reigns of
Elizabeth I and the Stuarts as it became more and more difficult to differentiate between defining
legal privateering and illegal piracy. The blurring of these two definitions and the crown’s
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responsibility to control piratical actions caused tremendous discord in foreign relations for the
British Empire. Historians have rightfully focused and explored the issues that Elizabeth, the
Stuarts, and the East India Trading Company faced when dealing with piracy. It cannot be
ignored, however, that these issues arose from the shifting relationship between the crown and
pirates that developed largely under Henry VIII and other European monarchs in the first half of
the sixteenth century. Piracy after 1536 became legally defined and thereafter took on new
connotations that could not be reversed. The crown created a symbiotic relationship with piracy
that altered how foreign relations were maintained in the Henrician era.
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CHAPTER 2
FROM PRIVATE THEFT TO ROYAL WARFARE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRIVATEERING IN ENGLAND DURING HENRY VIII’S REIGN

Kingdoms secretly engaged privately owned ships or individuals outside of the navy in
acts of war dating back to the fourteenth century. Henry VIII transformed privateering from a
covert method of war into a crown-sponsored practice with his decree in 1544, which issued
letters of marque to those who fought against the French. Henry’s statement that England would
sponsor privateering marked a pivotal change in how crowns associated themselves with
privateering. It also marked a significant moment in Henry’s reign which continued to influence
and lead the development of privateering in England after Henry’s death in 1547.
In the early portion of Henry’s reign, privateering often consisted of individuals separate
from the crown who could hold shares in private ships. Occasionally, men purchased shares
with foreign enemies, such as with the ship “The Salvador of Cadiz,” to split prizes and increase
their incomes. This created a sense of financial independence from the ruling monarch. The
custom of working with foreigners at sea gives insight as to why Frenchmen worked for Henry
against France in the 1540s. In 1543, Parliament began to change the practice of privateering
outside of the crown by issuing letters of marque and reprisal for certain individuals. Henry’s
decree in 1544 sought to use European Christian men as privateers, a definitive break from
Francis I who used Barbary corsairs, non-Christians and foreign Turks. As sources will reveal,
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Henry did not allow himself the option to deny association with privateers’ acts at sea due to
religious difference. While Francis could claim his lack of control over infidels, Henry gave
himself no such option. Unfortunately for England, the king’s policy of hiring predominately
Frenchmen to work as English privateers led to betrayal, as was the case with Jean Rotz. French
corsairs under Henry’s command used tactics to earn back their own French king’s favor and,
therefore, maximized their profits.
After Henry’s death, Edward VI, Mary I, and Elizabeth I’s issued their own decrees
which concerned privateering during their own respective reigns. These decrees, which included
Edward’s Proclamation of 1549, Mary’s Proclamation of 1557, and Elizabeth’s Proclamation of
1585, all of which mirrored their father’s decrees, further signify the influence Henry VIII had
on the legal development of privateering as crown-sponsored warfare which has previously been
credited to Elizabeth alone. This chapter sets out to explore English relations with privateers and
the importance of these developments under Henry VIII and after his reign. The development of
privateering under the English crown began with private individuals which helps explain the
king’s decision to utilize pirates in warfare. Henry’s declaration in the 1540s that England would
officially sponsor privateering set the standard for subsequent monarchs when they issued their
own proclamations concerning privateers.
To understand fully why French seamen were willing to work under Henry VIII against
France in 1544, one must first understand sea life and ship-owning. Private ship-owning rarely
resulted in one man purchasing a sole share in an entire ship. Instead, to lower risk and
maximize profit, men purchased small shares of a ship, which was divided among a number of
people depending on their personal wealth and the size of the ship itself. All decisions about
purchasing and selling ships or goods in the business of merchants rested on profits. The wealth
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of merchants, unlike that of the nobility, depended less on the king and more on their own
abilities to calculate profit and risk margins. In other words, foreign alliances or rules dictated
by the court did not necessarily determine merchants’ personal transaction decisions, often
leading them to ignore trade embargos that the crown issued. An example of this can be seen in
a letter from Ferdinand of Aragon in 1513. In this letter, he reacted to Spanish vessels being sold
to Henry VIII, ordering Don Luis Caroz, the Spanish ambassador in England, to “tell him
[Henry] that, according to the laws of the country, Spanish subjects are forbidden to sell ships to
foreigners. . . . The persons, therefore, who have sold the vessels to the King of England have
incurred grave penalties.”80 From this letter a few points can be highlighted. One large point is
that the potential profit of selling ships to the King of England outweighed any calculated risk of
fees for the shipbuilding merchants if the Spanish crown discovered these transgressions. That
some Spaniards decided to go against their crown’s own law and sell ships to aid the English
reveals their dedication to increasing their wealth and their favoring business over politics. From
this, one gets a glimpse into how those working at sea had a different view of loyalty to their
king than did landed nobles, who depended on the king’s generosity to fund their expenses.
Another example of comradery at sea that demonstrated the refusal to work only for
one’s homeland can be discerned from a certificate of ships in the Thames in 1545. One ship,
The Christofer, included men named Hans Martenbecke, Hans Nulke, Andrew Bucke, Johan de
Sueta, and Walter Shosche. Of all these men, only Johan de Sueta’s origin was labelled as
“Hispanyarde,” denoting his links to Spain.81 Despite this, one can safely conclude that Andrew

80
King Ferdinand the Catholic to Diego de Quiros his Envoy in England, July 1513, in Calendar of Letters,
Despatches, and State Papers, Relating to the Negotiations Between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives
at Simancas and Elsewhere, Volume 2, Henry VIII, 1509-1525, ed. G. A. Bergenroth (London: Longmans, 1886),
143-144.
81
Ships in the Thames, July 28, 1545, in Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII, Volume 20 Part 1,
January-July 1545, ed. James Gairdner and R. H. Brodie (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1905), 632-

45

Bucke was English and that Hans Martenbecke and Hans Nulke were of German, Dutch, or
Scandinavian origin. The point that this record emphasizes is that even though some of their
countries had tensions among them, these seamen could nonetheless come together on board a
single ship in order to make a profit. This further explains the French incentive to work for the
English. Even officials keeping record on land who recorded the diverse crews found the
practice completely normal and unremarkable. With the ability to work for foreign vessels
already available in the merchant community and trade, it is not shocking that pirates would do
the same in acts of war.
Even further, a report from the same day written about a ship named “The Salvador of
Cadiz” denoted the shared owning of a ship between an Englishman and a Spaniard:
Nic. de Harraria of Cadiz in Spain and Wm. Wilford, grocer, of London and Cadiz,
owners of the ship Salvador of Cadiz, now at London, are bound to Martin de
Astigarenia, of Motrico, pilot of the said ship, in 50 ducats received by exchange for
victualling and apparelling the said ship, to be paid at Cadiz for his services in the
pilotage of her thither.82
This report reflected a lack of tension between Spanish and English ship owners despite Charles
V’s betrayal of Henry VIII in 1544 in order to negotiate peace with Francis I, which led to a low
point in Anglo-Spanish relations at this time. The report that a London grocer owned half of a
Spanish ship included no allegation that the grocer was in any way betraying England. The
report solely referred to business and the process of sending 50 ducats to a Spanish man by the
name of Martin de Astigarenia. This report reveals an ability of those at sea or in the maritime
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and merchant business to be able to put their countries’ grievances aside in order to conduct
business without any accusations of disloyalty to the crown or of treason. As a result, Henry had
every right to assume that Frenchmen would remain loyal to an English cause in his efforts
against France as long as he conducted his business correctly and promised them higher
earnings. At the same time, it was also completely in the tradition of maritime business for the
French to betray Henry if the price was high enough. This he did not count on, but these
documents reveal that it was not inevitable that the French would betray Henry to their French
king and that the possibility that they would remain completely loyal to an English king existed.
This leads to a more nuanced understanding of the events that happened during the development
of crown-authorized privateering.
The years leading up to the 1540s contrasted with the noticeable shift in legally
sanctioned privateering, which occurred in 1543. Prior to 1543, merchants continuously
complained to the king about robberies and pirate attacks on the sea that cost them any profit that
they hoped to gain. In grants from September 1511 trade issues were recognized twice. John
Sharp, the groom of the Privy Chamber, requested on September 2 to be the king’s solicitor in
the ports in order to prevent frauds practiced by merchant strangers, stating that because of these
acts, “Henry VIII was defrauded of twelve ducats in the subsidy of three kerseys.”83 Sharp’s
request illustrated a need to regulate trade better and to keep theft of property from occurring in
foreign ports and on the seas. Without a substantial number of occurrences of fraud or thievery,
one can assume that the position would not have been granted. By September 29, the account of
William Stafford, the Keeper of Change and Mint and Keeper of Coinage felt the need to denote
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he was not responsible for reimbursing those who lost goods from fraud. His mint account
stated, “He does not answer for. . .profits of coinage of 1oz of gold buillon bought by merchant
strangers and exported elsewhere than to the staple of Calais.”84 Stafford realized the crown
could not afford financially to uphold the responsibility of reimbursing merchants every time
fraud occurred with shipments. Significantly, he mentioned Calais, which was where the
shipments were intended to be delivered. Calais, a place considered as a site of noble exile for
contemporaries, dealt with acts of fraud and piracy on a regular basis. In January 1513, Jehan
Velle, a merchant, wrote to the Deputy of Calais, Richard Wingfield, begging him to “explain to
the Almoner [Wolsey] that he is unable to supply him with wine, his ship having been stopped at
Rochelle and his herrings lost.”85 This letter reflected certain knowledge of Wingfield’s possible
sway with Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, the king’s administrator and most trusted advisor, whose
prominence rose when in 1515 he became the Lord Chancellor. While revealing a personal
connection with Wolsey, the letter also suggests that the Deputy of a major port town was
accustomed to these grievances and would be better capable of relating the news of the lost
goods to Wolsey in general.
In 1539, three years after Henry passed the Act of 1536, a shift in the language of the
complaints issued started to occur. Instead of complaints of business fraud or complaints of
thievery, “piracy” increasingly became the normal identifying term for these acts. On February
9, Thomas Vaughan, an influential English merchant and diplomat, wrote to Thomas Cromwell,
another favorite of the king who in 1539 had many influential positions including, Lord Privy
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Seal, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Principal Secretary, that Vaughan heard “of four ships
the duke of Maghleburg has set to sea to take the merchants' ships now going to England from
the cold mart. . . . The merchants' ships, being taken, would make a ‘fatt bote [booty]’ and being
‘such pevisshe small vessels’ could make no resistance; so the merchants entreat me to desire
your lordship's aid.”86 In this warning to Cromwell and request for aid, Vaughan highlighted that
a duke, a member of nobility, planned to use his ships in acts of piracy. It is important to note
that the merchants on board the ship, whom Vaughan quoted, recognized that the Duke of
Maghleburg knew they could not resist and planned to attack for the sole purpose of “booty.”
The terminology changed from the earlier discussions of merchants who complained only of
fraud in ports or stolen goods with little implication as to the circumstances of stolen goods.
Now merchants readily pointed to deliberate acts of piracy for the purpose of monetary gain
only. There was no mention of any tensions between crowns or merchant guilds that otherwise
provoked the attack.
This interpretation of Vaughan’s letter is further solidified by his subsequent letter to
Cromwell less than a week later in which he used the term “pirate” in reference to the same
situation. In the letter, Vaughan mentioned an informer who had “been a common passenger in
hoys between London and Antwerp, and who knows of certain pirates who purpose to take the
merchant ships going from hence.”87 Now there was a definite shift from dukes privately
attacking ships to labelling a noble as a pirate. This marked a significant change in how
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contemporaries during the reign of Henry VIII defined piracy and how authorities handled
attacks on merchant ships and theft of goods. No longer was there the murky area of fraud, for
which the crown had already denied responsibility. This was a definite illegal act of piracy that
could be taken to court for prosecution and the return of stolen goods. Additionally, Vaughan
gave a detailed description of the ships along with names of those who captained the ships, the
number of men on each ship, and the routes they took to avoid suspicion. He also revealed that
the galley ship under suspicion ran under a letter of marque from Yongher Baltezar whom he
described as “of a country adjoining the land of the Grave of Emden.”88 While the letter of
marque is interesting, it must be kept in mind that it was issued by an individual noble outside of
England, not by a monarch or within England. Accordingly, it did not mark any significant
break from previous privateering that nobles conducted independently of the crown.
The most interesting aspect concerning Vaughan’s letter, however, was his warning to
Cromwell about the merchants Vaughan was trying to protect. At the end of his letter he stated
that he wrote “nothing of this to the merchants, who are no men to keep counsel.”89 This
statement, along with his use of a private informer after the complaints from the merchants
themselves, points to the earlier point that above all else merchants were businessmen. Vaughan
did not trust merchants not to be involved in piracy themselves that went against England’s
interests if that piracy secretly benefitted them. Vaughan continued to emphasize to Cromwell
that “If you take and execute these pirates you shall avoid piracy from that place: if they escape
they will increase.”90 Contemporaries recognized the influence of piracy and the advantage it
gave those hoping to increase their wealth beyond that of which working with the crown could
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hope to offer. This reveals the strength of piracy at the time of Henry VIII and the increased
need to respond to those acts with legal prosecution. It also shows how strong the allure was for
others to start working with pirates.
Vaughan’s letters are not the only examples of the increasing use of the term “pirate.”
Prior to Vaughan’s complaints, in 1538 a clothworker of London, Wyllym Scarlet complained
that London merchants Henry Davy and Lyllyk “had lost 60/. in goods by Breton pirates.”91 On
April 12, 1540, Thomas Wyatt, acting as an English Ambassador within the Holy Roman Court,
wrote to Cromwell, “As to the pirate, he [Charles V] said such men were not to be cherished, and
he would see to his apprehension and justice,” signifying a growing need to address piracy
between monarchs.92 Two years later in 1542, William Paget, a member of the Privy Council
who by 1543 was sworn as the secretary of state, wrote to Henry VIII discussing “certain
London merchants lately spoiled by Robert Vall, a pirate.”93 All of these signify the growing
frequency of piracy and the need to suppress such illicit acts on the sea. As these complaints
continued into 1544, when Henry finally decreed legal privateering as an act of war, they
increasingly focused on French acts of piracy. The tension these acts caused between the
countries was undeniable.
The letter Paget wrote to Henry VIII indicated that the French king
said he was doing what he could to apprehend Vall, who had deceived him, for he
promised to conquer the land of Canados, and for that purpose had received ships and
furniture and as many prisoners as he would choose out of the prisons, for peopling the
said country, and now left the enterprise, and lay upon the coast of Brittany, robbing all
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that came in his way. He should be hanged, and his lands converted to pay those whom
he had robbed.94
In the letter that Francis I wrote which Paget referenced, the French king admitted to supplying
the person in question but denied any knowledge that Vall intended to use the royally sanctioned
supplies for piracy. This became a recurring line of defense for Francis to deny involvement
with piratical acts despite all other evidence of his full knowledge of French subjects’ intentions
against foreign countries, especially the English.
In September 1542, the Privy Council addressed a request from the French Ambassador
for the return of two French ships that the English apprehended when caught committing acts of
piracy. While a definitive answer was not granted to the French, the language denoted a certain
tone of sympathy about the situation, which became more apparent as one reads further. The
Council ordered the Deputy of Calais to release “a Frenchman [of unknown identity] imprisoned
at Calais for robbing a Burgundian within the Pale,” to De Bies.95 The Council then reminded
the deliverer of the letter that De Bies had only been gentle toward Sir John Wallop, who a year
later would lead a troop of 5,000 men against the French to Calais under Henry’s orders and
therefore deserved the same treatment. Calais remained an important location for handling
piracy as well as a place to send those who had fallen out of favor with the King, such as Wallop.
It is also interesting to note that the English tended to show sympathy and a willingness to
concede prisoners or ships captured that were involved in acts of piracy depending on the
Frenchman’s willingness to work with the English. From this, one can discern Henry worked
handled cases of piracy differently when dealt with through individuals instead of the king of
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France. The treatment toward individuals was based on their own conduct and behavior after the
crime, not primarily the crime itself.
On the very same day as the Privy Council sent out its order to release a French pirate
from Calais, Chapuys, the Imperial Ambassador in England, wrote to the Queen of Hungary
demonstrating a much different image of how Anglo-French relations stood at the time. After
describing in detail the number of troops from different countries, Chapuys stated, “The French
at the camp lamented the lack of victuals for their horses, especially of barley. This is agreeable
news to the English, and although she may have heard it otherwise he thinks best to write it.”96
Clearly, England’s relation with French pirates and noble individuals was different from the two
countries’ relationship with each other. It is also notable that Chapuys stated that even abroad
there might have been a belief that the English were not actively against the French. Here, is the
sympathetic tone reflected in the earlier Privy Council statement. So England, for unknown
diplomatic reasons beyond the scope of this paper, tried to give the illusion of wishing good will
on the French at the same time that tensions between the two countries increased.
Chapuys’ letter revealed even more complexities of Henry’s foreign relations with France
upon his mention of piracy. Chapuys informed the Queen of Hungary, “Besides the army by
land, the King makes a great effort by sea, and his ships have already almost cleared this coast of
the French pirates, having lately taken two, one French and the other Scotch, laden with artillery,
harness, and other war provision.”97 This piece of Chapuys’ letter is interesting because as we
know, in 1536 Henry VIII decreed the Act against Piracy, holding England responsible for
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arresting and prosecuting piracy committed in its waters or by its subjects.
The Privy Council’s response to Paget’s earlier complaints came to fruition in the same
month as Chapuys’ letter. Yet again, piracy became a central issue about the amity between the
English and the French. The response opened with,
The King has received his of the 7th, and seen the platt sent therewith. As it appears that
the Admiral was "something moved" when he declared to Paget's man the taking of
certain of their ships, whereof their ambassador and the vicomte of Depe had sent word,
Paget shall take occasion to tell him that he has since written to the King to know the
certainty, and is, in reply, commanded to declare that the King marvels that it should be
thought he did anything against the amity, and that they set so little by that amity as to
give credit to every flying tale against it.98
Here, Henry denounced the complaints of merchants and diminished their credibility as
witnesses to piracy, accusing the French ambassador of having “seemed rather disposed to sow
division than to increase amity, by giving credit to flying tales of merchants and other light
persons.”99 Cunningly, Henry turned the complaints of piracy as an act used to create discord
rather than acknowledging his own apprehending of French ships. He also defended his
belligerence toward France by denying holding a multitude of French ships that had not
participated in piracy. The response continued, “The truth is that only four French ships are
stayed here,” and described in detail the act of piracy each ship committed, defending the
crown’s right to hold them. To further his case in apprehending the ships and ignoring the
French merchants’ complaints, Henry pointed out that “English merchants have suffered no
small loss by Frenchmen since this war began, whereof the King makes not so great
exclamations, and that Flemings (who, they say, are favoured in English ports) are no more
favoured than Frenchmen, but the King will suffer no depredations to be made in his ports by

98

Privy Council to Paget, September 21, 1542, in Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII, Volume
17, 1542, ed. James Gairdner and R H Brodie (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1900), 448-463. British
History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/letters-papers-hen8/vol17/pp448-463 (accessed April 1, 2017).
99
Ibid.

54

any nation.”100 This closing statement is a testament to the diplomatic skills utilized in disputes
over piracy. The Privy Council subtly, yet poignantly, offered a warning that complaints from
the French needed to stop before the English issued complaints of their own. Furthermore, they
denied any notion that because England was at war with France that the French merchants were
being mistreated or targeted by courts for illegal acts any more than any other country that
England was at peace with. The final statement speaks to the determination not only to avoid
diplomatic turmoil but also to assert the desire to keep English ports free from illicit activities.
From these letters, Henry held up the statute that he passed in 1536. Even though it seemed
outwardly to other European countries that Henry was making extensive progress in ridding
English waters from piracy his own actions within England speak otherwise.
Five months after Paget’s letter in March 1542, a petition to the Emperor's ambassador by
Henry Dowe, of Bolswoert, in Friesland appeared. This petition described how “a French pirate
boarded the ship, bound petitioner and his fellows and sailed with the prize to Cromer [a town in
England], where they sold it to Thos. Wodhous for 60 cr., although it was worth 300 cr.
Wodhous then permitted the pirate to depart, retaining the ship and goods, and sent petitioner
and his fellows empty away.”101 It took four years for a trial to occur for Woodhouse after
Dowe’s accusation of piracy but interestingly, despite questions concerning his involvement with
pirates, Woodhouse still became a vice-admiral.102 The Woodhouse example provides a plethora
of interesting points concerning piracy in England. Woodhouse was a noble who bought a stolen
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ship from a French pirate. This not only aided a criminal and supported criminal activity but
aided a foreign enemy, the French whom Henry was trying to clear the waters of. Even further,
it took four years for the trial to occur, which then did not lead to any sort of conviction but
instead led to his appointment as vice admiral. Despite the creation of the Act of 1536 in order
to address the problematic issues in piracy trials before 1536 where a stolen ship could not be
used as evidence without personal witnesses and the problem of prosecuting those who aided
pirates on land, these loopholes maintained itself in the Woodhouse trial that was held ten years
later. Not only were proceedings set by the king to aid in convicting those assisting pirates
ignored but it led to helping the person involved in piracy now become one in charge of
prosecuting it. The Admiralty was abusing its power and using it to gain from piracy, it was not
alone in gaining from these illegal acts.
As French piratical activity increased in English waters, letters of marque issued from
the Privy Council began to appear. April 1543 saw several letters of marque issued to
Englishmen in order to attack the French and Scots. On April 15, there was mention of “John
Fletcher, of Rye, who has letters of marque, to take only Frenchmen and Scots.”103
Subsequently, Sir John Russel, Keeper of the Privy Seal, was issued letters of marque as well as
John Bel., John Reynolds, Richard Caundishe, and Thomas Gye.104 In December 1543, Henry
“licensed all his subjects to esquipp as manie shipps & other vessels to the sea against his
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enemies, Scotts & Frenchmen, as they shall thinke good.”105 The country of England, not
individual nobles, seemed finally to begin to take an interest in privateering as an act of warfare
against its enemies. What is interesting about the development of privateering in England is the
contrast with the privateers used by the French. From the records of April 1543, one can discern
a heavy reliance on Englishmen, who were of course Christians, as privateers. This was in stark
contrast to Francis I who largely used Turkish Barbary corsairs. Not only were these men not
French but they were not Christian either, giving the French king a plausible denial in case any
ships sent to attack the English were apprehended.
There were several references concerning Turks or Barbary corsairs working for the
French in the English records. The first instance dated back to 1513 and Louis XII. In a letter to
Christopher Bainbridge, the Cardinal of York and Ambassador at Borne, Henry VIII wrote of
remarks the Scottish King, James IV, had said at court:
Recently the King of Scots addressed the following words to the English ambassador at
his court, the Dean of Windsor [Nicholas West]: “I shall appeal against the letters of
execution.” The ambassador answered that it was impossible to appeal from similar acts,
as the Pope had no superior; to which the King replied: “I shall appeal to Prejean the
Pirate and to the apostleship of the aforesaid formidable King of the French.”106
The reference to Prejean the Pirate indicated the renowned pirate whom Louis XII sent from the
Barbary Coast to protect trade routes. The Scottish monarch’s use of Prejean, who worked for
the French, as a threat against the English reveals not only the knowledge that Barbary corsairs
were being used but just how active and strong they were at sea.
The extent to which France used Turks became even more known during times of war.
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In 1542, Edmund Bonner, the Bishop of London, wrote to Henry VIII that “Advice was given
from Italy that three French galleys had passed to Constantinople, carrying three great
personages as hostages, to bring the 60 Turkish galleys to Marseilles.”107 Here the French not
only worked with Turks in France but went all the way to Constantinople in order to assemble a
larger Turkish armada in France. The letter continued, “the French ambassador at once obtained
an order from the Turk for 60 or 80 galleys to be ready within a month to depart under
Barbarossa [an Ottoman admiral who provided naval support to Francis I], who reckoned then to
have with the foists and galleys of Barbary, 150 sail. The Turk also despatched succour to Buda,
and an order to the Begliarbey of Grecia to look to the frontiers. Rather suspects the truth of
these advices.”108 Barbarossa had already been mentioned earlier in the letter as threatening
Charles V. This fact added to the significance of Francis I, a Catholic, working with Turks under
the Franco-Ottoman alliance to attack another Catholic monarch at a time of religious turmoil in
Europe. Yet the fact that these corsairs were not, in fact, Christian, gave room for Francis’s
denial or even a reason for rival monarchs to forgive France when the monarch’s actions were
questioned.
On November 2, 1542, Chapuys wrote to Charles V a lengthy letter discussing his
attempts to persuade Henry to ally with the Holy Roman Emperor. After a few pages, he
invoked the plan to persuade the Pope to forgive Francis for his acts with the Turks in order to
persuade Henry, Chapuys wrote, “And where we had said that if His Holiness were given cause
of resentment, he might easily be gained over by Francis, with the offer of Naples, and
persuasion that Francis only took intelligence with the Turk for lack of assistance from his
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Holiness.”109 Chapuys and the Emperor cunningly used the lack of proper assistance from the
Pope, the one who was supposed to protect his flock, as forcing the French to use foreign
heretics. This cleared the French of any guilt and created a trustworthy system for allying with
them again despite their collaboration with the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately for Chapuys,
Henry did not trust the French enough to think this plan had any credence and told Chapuys that
Spain was “ill informed of the affairs of France, and that Francis would be in no hurry to make
such offers.”110 It appeared Henry’s mistrust was right because in 1544 another report of the
French working with Turks at sea was written: “Captain Poleyn, the French king's agent with the
Turk, escaped from Barbarousa with five galleys and is now sent hither to the Emperor to report
‘those affairs.’ It is said that he is appointed vice-admiral of France, and already vaunts that he
will do wonders against you [Henry VIII] on the seas.”111
The importance in looking at these instances of the French working with Barbary corsairs
at sea is to recognize just how significant it was for Henry to choose to work with only Christian,
Western European men. Due to his break from the Catholic Church in 1534, Henry could not
claim the negligence of the Pope was the reason for allying with infidels. He was the head of the
Anglican Church and there was no way to twist an excuse that the king had neglected himself.
Even without the lack of a scapegoat, though, Henry’s choice to use Christian privateers
emphasizes just how strong a statement Henry wanted to make to the French as well as other
European countries.
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On December 20, 1544 Henry issued a proclamation for privateers in England “licensing
all subjects to equip vessels to sea against the Scots and Frenchmen; enjoining upon officers of
port towns to help that this liberty may have substantial effect; and forbidding the taking of
mariners, munition or tackle from such as so equip themselves.”112 Notice that Henry clearly
stated that only subjects, i.e., Englishmen, not foreigners, were included in this proclamation.
While we know that Henry did use French privateers, it is still clear that through this statement
that England would not be using Turks or infidels as the French were. The English monarch
boldly put in writing that his subjects, including English pirates, would now be mobilized at sea
under the English crown’s authority against European enemies. This reflected a military strength
and defiance toward the French methods of war that reveals a glimpse of what England’s navy
would become. There would be no apologies or excuses made for England by other monarchs,
and England was not expecting one.
The use of English privateers developed throughout the early 1540s but after Henry’s
Proclamation of 1544, the attraction of working with French corsairs, or pirates, increasingly
caught the king’s attention. Working in tandem with French pirates was not new in England.
Many nobles, merchants, and admiralty, had been collaborating with foreign pirates to increase
their profits throughout Henry’s reign. The crown, however, had actively opposed French pirates
on the English coast, prosecuting so many as to elicit bragging from Chapuys to the Holy Roman
Emperor and accusations of unfair prosecution from the French. After 1544, there was a shift
from the need to prosecute French pirates to a need to commission the work of those considered
enemies to England legally and diplomatically.
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As early as 1542, there is record of Jean Rotz, a French cartographer who would
ultimately betray Henry VIII and England. On October 7, 1542, Henry granted “Denization to
John Rotz, a native of Paris, Coleta his wife, and their children.”113 Denization granted Rotz all
rights held by a king’s natural subjects, even including the right to own land. This is
representative of the amount of faith Henry had in Rotz and other Frenchmen he hired, but it also
represented the king’s belief that bribery bought loyalty. By 1547, de Selve wrote to Francis
“Sire, if any enterprise were to be found on the side of Normandy, the contractors would not stay
because of the mariners, and pillagers from your kingdom, of which it has come, as we saw sixty
in the service of this king [Henry VIII].”114 The English crown’s use of French ships and
mariners was not going unnoticed by the French. Henry was building a vast fleet of foreign
ships that attracted the attention of the very enemy he was taking them from. Interestingly,
however, the French seemed more concerned with the individual Rotz who had been in England
at that point for five years. The very next day, on January 11, de Selve wrote to the Admiral
A Dieppois named Jean Roze, now in the service of the King of England, who gives him
160 crowns a year, "a very good-natured man, and very well versed in matters by the
navy and navigation," asked Selve to write to the king, to be able to return to France with
his wife and children, offering to pay "the money and finances which have accustomed to
be paid for such provisions." Selve notified the Admiral about this, pointing out that it
would be useful to secure the services of this personage, who seems very experienced, or
at least to deprive the King of England of him.115
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The correspondence concerning Rotz is valuable to follow because it reveals several matters
important to the argument of this paper. The first is the question of why Henry put faith into
foreign subjects to protect his kingdom against their own native country. As discussed earlier,
Henry was not being foolish to think paying more would attract the loyalty of French subjects.
The letter which de Selve wrote was the first that any French ambassador had written to Francis
concerning Rotz. Marillac, who served as the French Ambassador to England from 1537-1543,
never wrote anything about Rotz. There is a gap in sources from 1543-1546 that is either lost or
unable to be found that causes problems in a definite collection of data, but in de Selve’s
correspondence from 1546-1549, his letter dated January 11, 1547 contains the first mention of
Rotz, which subsequently led to quite a few more.
Dieppe, Rotz’s native town on the coast of Normandy, was a stronghold of pirates.116
There is no claim anywhere that Rotz himself ever committed acts of piracy, but he certainly
would have been familiar with the trade. Additionally, Elizabeth Bonner, a scholar who studies
the French navy, found that Henry VIII ordered Rotz to navigate vessels against the Scots and
the French as an act of war in 1544 and 1545.117 Whether or not Rotz previously engaged in
piracy, he acted as a French corsair under the English king. Further, even if a pirate, like many
men at sea, Rotz’s was motivated above all by monetary gain.
Rotz turned to Henry VIII for a position in England only after being denied a position in
France by Francis I. While working under Henry, Rotz took the opportunity to map the Scottish
and English coasts which he then began using as a negotiation tool to return to France and
negotiate his. A year after Rotz’s first offer to de Selve, the French ambassador wrote again
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concerning the cartographer, noting “Selve reminded the constable of the offer of the Dieppois,
Jean Rotz, of whom he had already spoken to the late king, and who would be able to give an
account of all the ports and places of descent on the coast of England.”118 Letters followed in
which the negotiation and arrangements for Rotz’s return were conducted.119 Yet, even when
France agreed to his return, Rotz’s cunningness was apparent in a letter de Selve sent on May 29.
In this letter, Rotz promised to leave in only three or four days to return to France but demanded
that a royal officer of the French king apprehend him so that the English would not accuse him of
treason.120 Rotz protected his life but also ensured the possibility of returning to England if an
offer ever came from the new monarch, Edward VI. The fact that Rotz waited until after Henry
VIII’s death to leave England further suggested that Henry was correct in his assumptions
concerning loyalty of French privateers. It also helps explain why he did not find it risky to
build up such grand armadas of French ships that did not go unnoticed by the French. By
supplying the French with his maps of English and Scottish coasts, Rotz also served to illustrate
that privateers directly influenced foreign relations and war.
While Henry used French privateers against many countries, it seems that actual acts of
war were limited to the French. In September of 1537, the Privy Council reported acts of piracy,
specifically “General letters in favour of John de Canyon, as agent for recovery of the goods of
Ant. Bonvixi, Ant. Macuelo and others spoiled out of the galleon of John del Campo and four
Portuguese ships at Mungia in Calizia.”121 This report of the Privy Council indicated that a
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Frenchman, de Canyon, aided in recovery of goods from a total of five Portuguese ships at sea.
The important aspect of this comes from the word “recovery.” Henry did not send men to attack
the Portuguese in an act of war but to retrieve lost goods that Portuguese pirates stole from
English merchants. It is significant that he did not employ the admiralty, probably due to
jurisdiction issues about open sea, and that he did not contact Portugal to resolve the matter.
Instead he chose his own privateers to resolve the matter but this was not by any means
understood as an act of war. The contrast between this report and a letter that de Selve wrote in
November of the same year was extraordinary. De Selve wrote to the Admiral of France:
many say that these are only preparations against next year when a great enterprise
against Scotland both by sea and land is rumoured. At any rate I understand that the ships
are still on this coast, and men being openly levied both here and on the Scottish frontier
to go thither,—whether to defend or attack, I know not. . . Is just told that the Admiral of
England has let certain foreign captains know that they might hold themselves in
readiness to accompany him in the said enterprise of Scotland before Christmas.122
The origin of the foreign captains that Selve mentioned cannot be known, so they cannot be
labelled as French. Despite this, the warning Selve gave to France concerning their Scottish
allies does show that using foreign hired privateers at sea was an act of war against the French.
If these captains were not of French origin, it does not minimize Henry’s work with the French.
A broader scope of foreign privateers suggests only that Henry had a much more extensive
influence over men at sea than the sources available can say. One can safely assume, however,
that a few of these were French and willing to attack the country’s allies, therefore, provoking
France to war as well.
While a sense of nationalism had not developed during the reign of Henry VIII, there still
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existed laws against treason. The pursuit of wealth in support of one’s own sovereign was
presumably less risky than doing so against one’s king. While Francis used Barbary corsairs in
acts of war, his use of privateers was not limited to foreigners. The French king also utilized
French privateers at times. Since privateers who worked under one’s own king were safer
legally, it was significant that the English monarch tapped into something that pulled these men
to England. Clearly, Henry VIII developed a significant method of warfare that allowed him to
increase his fleets without risking more English lives, but how he did that has yet to be fully
understood and is not pertinent to this discussion.
Perhaps the long-term legacy of Henry’s legal treatment of privateering was more
significant than the actions during his own reign. After Edward VI’s death in 1553, Mary Tudor
ascended the throne to become Mary I. While popularly known for her persecution of
Protestants, historian G. D. Ramsay found that Mary continued her father’s alliance with piracy,
according to accusations levelled against her from Amsterdam.123 In the Proclamation declaring
war on France in 1557, the Queen granted permission to all subjects, not only the navy or the
military, to attack the French, stating, “We therefore command all Englishmen to regard Henry,
the French King, and his vassals as public enemies of this kingdom and to harm them wherever
possible, abstaining from trading or any other business with them.”124 The mention of trade,
allowing “subjects and merchants forty days to leave this kingdom with such property as the law
permits them to export,” in addition to accusing the French of allying with “pirates, enemies of
Christendom,” signified the continued usage of Barbary corsairs. This language used in Mary’s
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proclamation strengthens the fact that this proclamation included the use of privateering in
attacking French enemies even though it was not explicitly stated.125
Moreover, Mary proclaimed only two days later that privateers
shall enjoye, to his and there one proper use, proffyt, and commoditie, al and singular
such shippes, vessels, municion, marchaundyses, ware, victuals, and goodes, of what
nature and qualitie soever it be, which they sall take of anye their Majestyes’ sayde
enemys, without making accoumpt in any court or place of this Realme, or any other their
Majesties’ Realmes or dominions, for the same, and without paying any parte or share to
the Lord Admirall of England, the lord Warden of the five portes, or to any other offycer
or minister of their Majesties.126
This proclamation echoed, if not replicated, Henry’s proclamation of 1544 which stated, as we
saw in chapter one, that privateers “were to have the whole property in the prizes which they
took, without any bonus for the Lord High Admiral or the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports.”127
These statements from both the Tudor king and his daughter emphasized the reward in working
for the crown. Privateers kept the total of their prizes and none had to be given to the Lord
Admiral. Mary recognized that her father’s promise to allow privateers to keep 100% of their
confiscated goods was invaluable for utilizing this type of warfare. With this promise,
privateers’ goods that they won at war were protected by the crown. This protection provided a
reason to work with the crown rather than independently where, if caught, their captured goods
would be confiscated. This often overlooked proclamation by Henry which first allowed crownsponsored privateering continued to be used with little to no alteration by subsequent monarchs,
even by his daughter Mary who is not usually remembered for her work with pirates.
Elizabeth also mirrored her father in a proclamation issued in 1585 as hostilities between
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England and Spain rose. Despite the clear influence from Henry VIII, many historians still point
to this proclamation in order to credit Elizabeth’s innovative relationship with privateers. In a
list of articles, the Privy Council laid out the guidelines for the restitution of goods stolen at sea.
The Council made clear that the loss of goods had to be proven and then one could capture
Spanish ships and goods for compensation at a time of war.128 Interestingly, Elizabeth showed
no interest in the goods being handed over to the crown, even though some of the cases involved
merchants whose stolen goods likely were orders commissioned from England. Instead, the
queen ordered that after bringing the goods back to England and taking inventory of them, the
captor could keep all prizes.129 Here is a clear repetition of Henry VIII’s use of incentive when
utilizing privateering as warfare. Elizabeth masked acts of war by giving the illusion that the
main goal was only to grant those at sea the ability to retrieve stolen goods. Men attacked and
robbed enemies of the crown at sea while gaining their lost goods and more in return.
Both Tudor daughters mirrored their father’s use of privateering but what about the short
reign of his son, Edward VI? Probably the most overlooked Tudor monarch, Edward even
licensed several Englishmen to hire mariners and soldiers in order to attack “only against the
Kinge’s majesties enymyes, and not otherwyse.”130 Edward passed only one order concerning
privateering during his short reign but its significance is not lost. Since Henry’s crown
sanctioned the use of privateers against enemies at times of war, none of his children forgot the
success England gained due to these naval mercenaries. Regardless of the length of their
respective reigns, each Tudor monarch utilized privateering as an act of war. Arguably, one can
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make the case that Elizabeth’s extensive use of it did not come from a unique naval strategy but
rather reflected the influence of her father’s success combined with the length of her reign. As
these sources have proven, Elizabeth’s use of privateering was anything but original in the line of
Tudors. Instead the length of time that she had to develop and expand her use of privateers
contributed to her fame as “Pirate Queen.”
Beyond the legal proclamations concerning privateering, all of Henry’s children also
carried on his policy of hiring only European Christian men. Edward’s proclamation granted
money to men who agreed to provide privateers for the crown including: Christopher Savere,
John Buggyns, John Wotton, Richard Foller, Alexander Colles, John Samys, William Harwell,
Christofer of Totnes, George of Totnes, and John of Totnes, along with the Post of Dartmouth as
recepients.131 Mary’s proclamation in 1557 reflected her brother’s use of English privateers
specifying that they be “their subjects. . .that they and every of them maye at their liberties
without incurring any losse daunger gergeyture or penalty, and without suing forth of any other
lycence vidimus. . .prepare and equippe to the seas such and so many shippes and vessels,
furnished for the warre, to be used. . .against their Graces sayd enemyes.”132 Elizabeth’s many
letters of marque and reprisal all reveal Englishmen, such as William and George Wynter in
1569, John Kitchen in 1585, George Reyman in 1591, and John Hawkins and Francis Drake in
1595.133 A step further in the path of her father’s choice of privateers, Elizabeth was also known
for her use of French Huguenots. This act became more significant as a reflection of Henry
VIII’s policy when compared to Henri II of France who continued to work with Turks at sea in
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the Ottoman-Franco alliance. Elizabeth, like her father, did not hide her acts of piratical warfare
behind foreign non-Christian subjects. Instead, she put in writing the authorization of countless
Englishmen to practice privateering at sea against her enemies. These subjects, regardless of
crown authorization, would still be considered the responsibility of the monarch to prosecute due
to Henry’s act in 1536. Elizabeth’s assertion that they worked under her orders reveals her
determination to show Europe the strength not only of Christianity but England. Henry VIII’s
use of his own subjects, along with French subjects, was again reflected in Elizabeth’s open
utilization of privateers fifteen years later. The open British use of privateers by all Tudors
shows the extent to which piracy had developed under Henry VIII, which in turn, influenced and
affected not only life at sea but also life at court and on land.
The decision to order crown-sanctioned privateering in England took time to develop.
First, it took new relationships being forged in the growing merchant community between men
of different countries with the aim of owning ships and buying shares in ventures at sea in the
hope of making profit through a privately funded form of privateering. This increasingly led to
members of the nobility and the Admiralty starting to work with pirates in order to create their
own wealth separate from the crown. As individual ventures of privateering grew within
England, France strengthened its alliance with the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the number of
Barbary corsairs harassing the English and other European Christian countries increased and
tensions rose. As more and more complaints of French piracy were made in English jurisdiction,
and Francis I issued complaints against England for holding ships, Henry found himself running
out of options for dealing with the issue at sea.
This directly led to the unique development in England to declare publically through the
Privy Council the order from the king for privateers to arm themselves and set sail under the
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crown’s sanction in order to attack the French. Not only did Henry VIII make his use of
privateering as an act of war known throughout Europe, he utilized his own subjects and other
Christian Europeans, predominately the French with whom he was at war. Furthermore, as
evidenced by the case of Jean Rotz, he granted land and the full rights of an English subject to
some of these Frenchmen. This voided any possibility of denying his hand in any attacks from
pirates or privateers who were not English. Henry now had to take full responsibility for the
actions of those sanctioned by the crown to attack enemies on the water unlike the French, who
could claim negligence of the Pope caused their alliance with Turks and that the heretical
Barbary corsairs were acting against their orders.
The actions of later Tudor monarchs, even more than the acts of Henry himself,
strengthens the importance of the development of privateering. Edward VI, Mary I, and
Elizabeth I all followed their father’s precedent in the crown’s relationship with privateering.
All used privateers against their enemies and dealt exclusively with European Christians, even as
the French continued using Barbary corsairs. These three monarchs not only revealed the
importance of Henry’s contribution to privateering, and inadvertently, to naval development, but
also proved that historians have over-emphasized the importance of Elizabeth’s role in working
with pirates and crown-sanctioned privateering. Historians have focused on Henry VIII’s impact
on religious affairs, due to his decisive role in the Reformation through his break with Rome. As
new aspects of his reign are uncovered, however, there is an increasing realization that Henry
altered long-lasting practices in areas outside of the church in England.
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CHAPTER 3
ADMIRAL, FRIAR, PIRATE: BERNARDINE AND THE AMBIGUITY OF PIRACY IN
HENRICIAN ENGLAND

Prior to the development of a legal definition of piracy, which occurred in 1535 and
1536, the label of “pirate” was ambiguous. During the early portion of Henry’s reign, a man
named Bernardine was an admiral to the French, a friar to the pope, and a pirate to the English.
While he acted officially for one country, another country viewed his acts as illegal theft at sea.
By conducting a case-study and examining correspondence written between 1512-1528
concerning this one figure, this chapter will make the importance of Henry’s contribution to the
legal development of piracy even clearer.
Friar Bernardine, as he was known throughout Europe, allows an examination on just
how imprecise the label of pirate could be before 1535. In France, Friar Bernardine was a
French Admiral who commanded fleets of ships and helped guard the transportation of nobles
across the sea. In England, however, Friar Bernardine was referred to as the “French pirate.”
For the English, the acts Bernardine committed were not acts of an admiral at war but acts of
theft, deceit, and self-gain. Complicating the image of Friar Bernardine even more was his
relationship with the pope. While he was not explicitly listed as a member of a religious order,
the fact that across Europe he was commonly referred to as a friar, along with the pope’s issuing
a personal order to Bernardine to attack Turkey in defense of Christendom points to another
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interesting and complex layer of the man whom England saw only as a pirate. This case-study
seeks to reveal the different views of who a pirate was depending on which country was
discussing the man in question. After 1535, and especially after 1536, this label became more
uniform. After Henry’s legal definition was established, all European countries recognized the
same acts as piracy, regardless if the pirate himself worked under a multitude of identities. Friar
Bernardine reveals that before 1535, a crown-sponsored official for one country could be viewed
and treated as a pirate by another country.
The first mention of Friar Bernardine during Henry’s reign came from John Stile, an
English diplomat to Spain under Henry VII, who wrote to Henry VIII in 1512. The lengthy letter
gave advice on English relations with Spain and France. Stile made many references to Henry’s
father, Henry VII, and his actions as king, and he advised the younger Henry to follow in his
father’s footsteps. The letter covered the 1512 military campaigns in Navarre and for the most
part gave no specific names of enemies beyond the high nobility. Stile referred to a few specific
names acting in defense of Navarre against the French, such as the Duke of Alva, Don John de
Beaumonte, and Santy Steven, but referred to the French only as “Frenschemen” or “partys of
France.” The first actual name mentioned in regard to French forces was Friar Bernardine, or
Bernaldyno, at the end of the letter. That Stile did not name a Frenchman in a letter over five
pages long until Bernardine is significant in itself. From this, one can conclude that Bernardine
was a name that Stile assumed Henry would recognize and would understand the threat which
Bernardine presented to the English in their endeavors. Stile closed his plea for Henry VIII to
send an “armey” to combat Bernardine, and another naval officer, Perys Mogher, who had stolen
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ten ships off the coast of Portugal and sought to attack the King of Portugal.134 A closing plea
should not be shrugged off as a last-minute note. This was Stile’s last chance to convince Henry
to follow Henry VII’s foreign policy of allying with the Spanish. Stile’s choice to use
Bernardine as the closing plea for aid from Henry reveals the threat the friar represented not only
to the English but also to their allies.
While it is important to recognize the notoriety of Bernardine’s prowess at sea, it is even
more important to examine how the English labelled Bernardine at this early point in Henry’s
reign. Stile did not label Bernardine a pirate. Instead Stile referred to him as a captain in charge
of French men of war.135 This letter was written two years after the English and French Treaty
of 1510, and despite the diminishing peaceful relations, the treaty outlined piracy as involving
acts separate from the two crowns. Bernardine represented this early definition in use by a
contemporary. A man whom the English would later call a pirate, under the current definition
outlined in 1510 was viewed as a legitimate naval officer acting under the French crown’s
orders. Bernardine did steal ships and set out to kidnap a king both acts of a piratical nature, but
the difference in 1512 was that these acts were known to be orders from the crown, not acts
carried out independently at Bernardine’s own initiative.
The recognition of Bernardine as a legitimate member of the French navy continued until
1515. In 1513, Edward Echyngham, an English knight, wrote a letter to Wolsey informing the
cardinal of an English admiral’s death. Within this letter appeared the first mention of
Bernardine’s title of friar. Immediately after stating the need for a new admiral, Echyngham
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wrote that “Frere Barnardyn” was at Bordeaux.136 The letter does not mention anything else
concerning Bernardine but does contribute to the complexity of Bernardine’s identity and how
the English viewed him, incorporating a religious title with recognition of his work in the navy.
Another letter in 1513 from Thomas Howard to Wolsey again discussed Bernardine. Howard
opened the letter informing Wolsey of ships carrying wine and linen in Brittany. He went on to
state that “Friar Barnardyne” was searched for in Brittany and believed to have ten galleys, but
Howard did not believe the claim. He stated that he had previously heard of Bernardine having
only one galley and a foist.137 Once again, Bernardine was the only specific name mentioned
within the letter and there was no reference to piracy. The English knew who Bernardine was
and knew that he was an admiral working for the French. The fact that the English did not refer
to Bernardine as a pirate for several years strengthens the claim that the label pirate constantly
changed and evolved under Henry VIII. What made the English, who knew Bernardine was a
French admiral, suddenly start referring to him as a pirate?
The shift from admiral to pirate in the eyes of the English began in 1515. On March 30,
Venetian Ambassadors in England, Andrea Badoer, Sebastian Giustinian, and Pietro Pasqualigo
wrote to the Signory of Venice from Paris. The men informed the Signory that King Francis had
dispatched Friar Bernardine and Prejean, a Turkish admiral, to Marseilles. There, the two
admirals were to fit out twelve galleys in addition to the twelve that were already at Marseilles.
The letter describes worries that the French would not keep their alliance with Venice, which the
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two states had created under Louis XII. Francis argued that the previous French king’s death in
1515 voided all treaties made under him.138 The concern the men held about the new French
king keeping his alliance with Venice derived from his orders for Friar Bernardine to prepare
ships for battle. The ambassadors saw Bernardine acting under the orders of the king and, as
such, did not view him as a pirate. It was not this letter but rather his association with Prejean
that caused the English to change their perception of Bernardine from a French admiral to a
rogue pirate.139
The English, as discussed in chapter two, already knew of Prejean from the Scottish
monarch, James IV in 1513. In a letter, Henry VIII wrote of James IV referring to the Turk as a
pirate. Because of Prejean’s Turkish origin and Francis I’s use of Barbary corsairs, Prejean
became known to other Europeans as a pirate, but this was not the case from his own
perspective. Prejean considered himself an Ottoman admiral, just as Bernardine was a French
admiral. It was only through shifting majority perceptions of what determined piracy that both
came to be described as such. Bernardine’s association with Prejean, who had been viewed as a
pirate in England for at least two years, cast doubt upon the French admiral’s legitimacy from the
English perspeective.
Further distrust and a developing image of deceit concerning Bernardine came in 1517
when Francis refused to send Bernardine to fight the Turks, who were preparing to attack
western Europeans. Instead, a letter of unknown origin which relayed news from France to
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England suggested that Bernardine, along with Peter Navarre, a Spanish admiral, would instead
attack the English and advised that travel be reduced and carefully guarded.140 Despite this still
being recognized as orders of the French monarch, there was still a connection between
Bernardine and the Turks, which caused Bernardine’s European reputation as a respectable
admiral to be diminished. As Bernardine continued to work for Francis, who allied himself with
infidels which the English viewed as pirates, the friar’s own image as an admiral of the French
navy diminished. The English often referred to Francis I working with Barbary corsairs, or
pirates, when he was in fact working with officials and admirals through a series of agreements
between France and the Ottoman Empire. Further implicating Bernardine’s dishonesty and
deceit to the English was his supposed plans to attack Naples in 1519.141 As Bernardine
increasingly worked with the Turks and against European interests, the English increasingly
blurred his official status as admiral with that of a pirate just as the English did to the Ottoman
Turks.
The next mention of Bernardine from English records came in 1522 and was the first to
refer to him as a pirate. Richard Pace, the English ambassador in Venice, and Bishop John Clerk
wrote to Wolsey informing him that Cardinal Medici’s servant Felix Trophinus, who served as
collector in England, was kidnapped by Bernardine, the “French king’s pirate on the sea.”142
Pace and Clerk testified to the increased tension between the French and other Europeans. They
wrote that those who resided in the Italian states would not allow France to win any honor in
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their enterprises at sea.143 Pace and Clerk seemingly agreed to minimize the legitimacy and
credibility of the French naval enterprises by of labelling one of the best French admirals as a
pirate for the first time. If the French should have no honor, neither should their admiral who
kidnapped a notable servant of a cardinal, not in a fair act of war but in an act of deception and
malice.
A more interesting aspect of this letter was the overall religious tone to it. Further
complicating Pace and Clerk’s original referral to Bernardine as a pirate was their emphasis on
his role as a friar. When describing who kidnapped Cardinal Medici’s servant, they first
described Bernardine as the “holy apostate friar Bernardo” before labelling him as a pirate.144 As
earlier correspondence has revealed, this was not the first time Bernardine was referred to as a
friar but it was the first time his role in the church was emphasized. Pace and Clerk wanted to
portray Bernardine not only as a deceitful man acting under the dishonorable French but as a
man of the cloth acting against the church, and even further, against Christianity since he worked
with the Turks. From this letter, Bernardine transformed from a respectable, skilled admiral
working for a rival country to a man who was so unprincipled that he could not even follow his
holy vows for the sake of Christendom. Clerk and Pace emphasized this fact in the beginning of
their letter in which they wrote that “all is in confusion sufficient to subvert the authority of the
Church.”145 Not only were kings not to be trusted to act in the Catholic Church’s best interest
but, as was the case they presented with Bernardine, neither were those who were ordained.
In contrast to the strongly worded letter from the English ambassador and bishop, the
letter that Julius, the Cardinal de Medici, wrote to Wolsey concerning the same situation had a
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much different tone. For the Venetian cardinal, Bernardine remained an admiral. His secretary,
Trophinus, was not kidnapped by a pirate but taken prisoner by a French admiral. Further,
Bernardine did not act against church authority but acted under the authority of his king, Francis,
with whom Cardinal de Medici requested Wolsey to intercede on his behalf in order to have his
secretary released.146 This does not contradict the above interpretation but instead presents the
complexities of identities at sea during the early half of Henry’s reign. English diplomats saw
Bernardine as a pirate who acted maliciously against the church which he served. The Italian
Cardinal, however, saw him only as an admiral following the orders of his king who believed his
secretary held objectionable information which threatened the kingdom of France.
Further entrenchment of Bernardine’s piratical traits of deceitfulness came from
intelligence gathered from an unknown French spy. Writing from Calais, the spy informed
English officials that he had been at Dieppe where several ships were being prepared secretly.
The spy then travelled to Caudebec and then Honfleur, where Bernardine had been three weeks
before the spy’s visit.147 The letter did not refer to Bernardine as either a friar or a pirate, but it
emphasized the deceitfulness of the French. The spy wrote of Bernardine constructing harbors at
Honfleur and Harfleur, both port towns on the northwestern coast of France that served as
raiding posts to set out from and ransack English coasts. From these ports, the French went so
far as to destroy parts of the towns in Kent. The significance of Bernardine building harbors
becomes even more apparent with this knowledge. The English, who knew of the threat of raids
from these locations, both naval and piratical, made this letter even more significant to their
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understanding of Bernardine’s identity. Bernardine’s work in these ports combined with the
English predisposition to label him as a pirate only emphasized his own threatening role beyond
that of a French naval official. The French spy emphasized Bernardine’s manipulative nature
and informed the English that Bernardine was to collect secretly the great ships of Brittany,
which were to be located at the newly built harbors. Even further, he noted that Bernardine left
his own galleys at sea to rid any suspicion the English might have.148 While the spy recognized
that these were French naval tactics and not Bernardine acting alone as a pirate, he did not
portray him as a noble man following the orders of his misguided king but as someone who
could not be trusted and was cunningly trying to manipulate and outsmart the English. This
helped nurture the English perception that Bernardine fell under the definition of a pirate rather
than that of a French admiral.
The entire time that the English increasingly viewed Bernardine as an unrespectable
pirate, the French granted him more responsibilities under the crown. The day after the French
spy wrote of Bernardine, Sir Thomas Cheyne wrote Wolsey with his own concerns. Cheyne
served as Sheriff of Kent and, four years after this letter, would be granted the position of Justice
of the Peace for Kent which he would hold until his death in 1558. As sheriff of Kent, a place
that was already familiar with the dangers from Honfleur and Hafleur, Cheyne wrote a lengthy
letter of his concerns about French maneuvers in the English Channel. Concerning Bernardine,
Cheyne described his conversation with William Baxi, a merchant, who reported that Bernardine
was leaving for Marseilles the next day. He would immediately take to sea fifty ships and
galleys which Francis I had sent to Brittany and Normandy in order to make as many ships ready
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for war as possible.149 Cheyne, someone who presumably had experience with French naval
maneuvers at these locations, viewed Bernardine more respectably and as someone acting under
a king’s orders. The previous language of deceit and manipulation was absent from the letter,
even concerning the French king. Even within England, there were differences of opinion about
which traits and actions defined a pirate.
Revealing the complexities of defining piracy even more, Cheyne’s letter described the
French perspective of England and Francis’s accusations that Henry VIII was involved in piracy.
At the beginning of Cheyne’s letter, he described his interaction with Francis I concerning
English merchants and goods that the French king held in his possession. Francis responded to
the English request of restitution of goods that nothing would be done to release them until
England restored the stolen goods of his own subjects. Here the French king indicated that
England was the one responsible for theft, piracy, and deceit and Francis’s own actions were
only in response to that. Cheyne specifically cited Francis’s statement that Englishmen had
taken three French ships off the coast of Dieppe, a known location of piracy among
contemporaries.150 Without saying the words, Francis all but accused the English of the same
piracy of which they accused his own officials. The king even went on to accuse Henry VIII of
setting out ships of war of his own with letters of marque to rob French subjects, followed
quickly by Cheyne’s denial of Henry’s doing any such thing.151 The tone of the conversation
between Cheyne and Francis I, combined with Cheyne’s own interpretation of Bernardine’s
actions, further reveals how actions viewed as legal by one country could be interpreted as illicit
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piracy by another. Additionally, the interpretation of what could be labelled a piratical act varied
not only by country but by individual as well. At a time when no standard definition had been
established, anyone could be accused of piracy, even a king.
While the northern half of Europe argued over who had conducted acts of piracy first, the
southern states seemed unconcerned with any discussion of piracy. In 1522, the pope sent
Bernardine to Rhodes to fight infidels. Robert Wingfield, an ambassador at the court of
Margaret of Savoy in Brussels, wrote to Wolsey of Margaret’s plans against Francis. At the
closing of the letter, Wingfield informed the cardinal of the siege of Rhodes where Bernardine
entered under the pope’s order with 3,000 men.152 In the letter, despite the obvious ill intent
toward the French, Wingfield recognized Bernardine again as a friar and not a pirate. The letter
held a deeply religious tone due to the circumstances of Rhodes which shaped how he viewed
and interpreted Bernardine’s own identity. For the first time since Stile who served Henry VII,
an Englishman referred to Bernardine as a notable man of war. Under the guidance of the pope,
the father of Christendom, Bernardine’s noble and respectable status was reinstated, at least for
Wingfield.
The renewed respectability of Bernardine through his service to the pope caught hold in
Spain as well as in Brussels. Three years later, the Duchess of Alençon, also known as
Marguerite of Navarre, needed safe transportation to Madrid. Marguerite, sister to Francis I, was
sent for when Francis fell ill during the time that Charles V held the king hostage in Spain after
his capture at the Battle of Pavia. Marguerite, who was accompanied by the Grand Master of
Rhodes, Phillipe Villiers de l’Isle-Adam, stayed there a couple of months. During this time, she
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was escorted by Friar Bernardine, in addition to Andrea Doria, an Italian who had entered the
service of the French in 1522, and Baron de Saint Brancard, another French vice-admiral.153
Jean Jonglet, who wrote the letter, was Head of the Embassy in London and the ambassador of
Margaret of Savoy to Henry VIII. From this, combined with Robert Wingfield’s previous letter
written at the court of Margaret of Savoy, one can conclude that Brussels did not hold the same
antipathy toward Bernardine as England did. The letter, written by a man from Brussels who
detailed a Spanish perspective, did not hold any tone of shock at the sister of the king being
transported by Bernardine, or that he worked alongside two other well-respected and, in Doria’s
case, renowned admirals. Even Charles V did not express any concern at how the princess
arrived in Spain even when he complained that a Spanish ship laden with merchandise had been
captured by French ships off the English coast.154 His concern did not reside with French pirates
or, more importantly, Francis’s association with Bernardine whom the English accused of being
a pirate, but with Henry’s failure to keep his coasts safe for merchants.
Less than three months later, the strongest allegation of piracy against Bernardine from
the English comes in a letter written in January 17, 1526 by Rowland Tayler. The husband of
William Tyndale’s niece, Tayler later became Thomas Cranmer’s chaplain and was eventually
burned at the stake under Mary I. Tayler wrote from Lyons where he met with Cardinal Louis de
Bourbon, uncle to Cardinal Charles II of Bourbon, a man the Catholic League would later
support as the rightful King of France after Henry III’s death in 1589. Tayler’s impression of
Cardinal Bourbon was not positive. He wrote that the Cardinal treated him so familiarly it
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brought him shame. Afterwards, he met with another cardinal, Cardinal François Guillaume de
Castelnau-Clermont-Ludève, the legate of Avignon. This meeting did not improve Tayler’s
negative impression of the Catholic Church or, consequently, of Bernardine.
During his conversation with Cardinal Clermont, Bernardine became a topic of
conversation. Looking to impress Wolsey, the cardinal told Tayler of the rich prize of goods
which Bernardine had taken from the Turks a Venetian ship coming from Constantinople.
Tayler wrote bluntly and referred to Bernardine directly as “the pirate.”155 This letter, written
directly to Wolsey, would have required a certain degree of formality, especially coming from
someone with so many evangelical ties. That Tayler so casually labelled Bernardine a pirate in
his letter was a testament to the English sentiment toward the French admiral. Regardless of
positive, or at least neutral, sentiment from the papacy, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the
Duchess of Savoy, England still saw Bernardine as deserving nothing more than the label of a
thief and dishonorable man. The letter’s tone did not improve when Cardinal Clermont
described the goods, detailing a “peece of ryobarbe” as large as his head. Tayler retorted that
there had been no good “ryobarbe” brought to England or Flanders for quite some time to which
the cardinal immediately promised to send to Bernardine for some for Wolsey.156 Tayler’s
response was not overly friendly and pointed out that whatever “ryobarbe” was, it was difficult
to import. His statement combined with his tone, and his subsequent labelling Bernardine a
pirate, let the cardinal know that he believed that the goods were not acquired in good faith. It
seems once again that despite a large swath of Europe viewing Bernardine as an admiral, English
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officials viewed him as nothing but a pirate, which only reinforced Tayler’s impression of the
Catholic Church.
Tayler’s letter is the last surviving legible letter to have been written about Bernardine
while he was alive. In 1528, a letter was written in French with a quick reference to Friar
Bernardine but is now too mutilated to detail who wrote it, whom it was for, or the specific
dates.157 The next mention of Bernardine came from Cardinal Jean du Bellay who acted as the
French Ambassador in England from 1527-1534. Du Bellay wrote to Anne de Montmorency,
who worked a year earlier with Wolsey to form an alliance between England and France. The
letter contained typical diplomatic rhetoric, which included information concerning Wolsey. It
was not until the very last sentence of the letter before du Bellay signed it that Bernardine was
mentioned. The mention had little to do with Bernardine himself, only stating, “Petitions for the
command of the galleys vacant by the death of Friar Bernardin, for his brother.”158 The French
correspondence maintained a tone of complete neutrality toward the death of the admiral. There
was no praise nor any negative remarks, a completely normal occurrence concerning the death of
a naval man. Three years after the English blatantly labelled Bernardine a pirate, the French
view had not changed, even with his death. To the French, in contrast to the English, Bernardine
was a French official, an admiral in the navy.
Even after Bernardine’s ships had been transferred to De Barbezieulx, another French
admiral who set out to meet Doria at sea, Bernardine’s name was still remembered. In a letter to
Du Bellay, Francis listed the ships that De Barbezieulx used which previously belonged to Friar

157

_ to _, 1528, in Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII, Volume 4, 1524-1530, ed. J S Brewer
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1875), 1672-1689. British History Online, http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/letters-papers-hen8/vol4/pp1672-1689 (accessed June 11, 2017).
158
Du Bellay to Anne Montmorency, in Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII, Volume 4, 15241530, ed. J S Brewer (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1875), 1672-1689. British History Online,
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/letters-papers-hen8/vol4/pp1672-1689 (accessed June 11, 2017).

84

Bernardine, including thirteen galleys, specifically mentioning La Grande Maistresse and La
Branouse.159 Over a year after Bernardine’s death, his name was still well-known enough to be
mentioned in relation to his ships despite someone else now owning them. Further, the French
could have used Bernardine as a scapegoat and claimed that any questionable acts unauthorized
by the crown were of Bernardine’s own making. During this time France already faced scrutiny
for working with Barbary corsairs. Additionally, England, as shown throughout this study,
viewed Bernardine as a pirate, so it would not have been difficult or unreasonable for Francis to
assert that Bernardine acted of his own volition in order to put to rest diplomatic tensions
between countries regarding affairs at sea. Francis did not, however, use Bernardine as a
scapegoat. That the idea seemingly never crossed the French king’s mind, nor any French
official’s mind, reveals the crown’s sanction and respect for Bernardine as well as his own
official status in the French navy. His identity, often vacillating for other Europeans among
French admiral, pirate, and friar, never existed as anything but an admiral for the French. The
disconnect between the French and other European countries shows the ambiguity of defining
piracy prior to Acts of 1535 and 1536. Officials of one country could be, and were, viewed and
treated as pirates by another country.
***
Through the case study of Friar Bernardine, the difficulty of determining who was
committing acts of piracy and who was following the orders of their crown prior to Henry VIII’s
Acts of 1535 and 1536 becomes clear. While Bernardine’s case has the best sources presently
available, other cases shed light on the ever-shifting meaning of “pirate” among European
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contemporaries. Prejean, an Ottoman admiral who worked with the French, was called a pirate
by the Scots and English.160 Blurring the lines of piracy even more, Margaret of Savoy
threatened English merchants with the label of pirates if they continued to smuggle banned
religious texts.161 A pirate during the early half of Henry’s reign did not necessarily refer to
someone who chose to act illicitly on the sea independently from his crown. Someone whom
one country denounced as a pirate could be working loyally for his king in another country.
Early treaties such as the Treaty of 1510 between the English and the French and the
Treaty of London in 1518 attempted to define piracy in a way that allowed a systematic way for
countries to work together in order to eliminate the dangers upon the sea which threatened
merchants and travelers. These treaties defined pirates as parties who attacked and robbed
subjects of another country. Crowns resolved these disputes by granting reparations to the
victims and working together to apprehend the perpetrators. While legally these treaties
addressed ridding the seas of piracy, they also enabled crowns to deny responsibility for attacks
on other countries. This in itself created a multitude of problems, especially between the English
and the French. Now a king could order an attack yet deny it with the defense that the men were
pirates acting against his own wishes, a defense that the French actively used with the corsairs
they employed. Moreover, as tensions increased and these treaties fell apart, monarchs could
diminish the authority and reputation of officials from other countries by labelling them pirates,
as was the case with Bernardine and Prejean. Regardless of their status in their country, the
ability to call an admiral a pirate with no repercussion was a stronger weapon than one might
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suppose. During a time when communication was slow and unreliable, the labelling of an
official as “pirate” could significantly alter the admiral’s ability to sail the sea safely, their
reputation on land, and their treatment upon capture. The shifting definition of piracy which
opened up possibilities to crowns for denying attacks now presented problems in controlling and
protecting their navies.
The legal difficulties which emerged from plausible deniability and slander due to the
lack of a definitive and clear definition of piracy became largely resolved in 1535 and 1536 when
Henry VIII addressed the judicial treatment of piracy in England. The Act of 1535 made acts of
piracy on sea liable to be treated the same as acts of theft on land. Further, a confession from the
pirate was no longer needed to impose a death sentence. Juries now issued verdicts based on
evidence and testimonies of witnesses. Further, with the Act of 1536, Henry brought in the use
of common law and courts of oyer and terminer which could use circumstantial evidence in
addition to direct evidence. This directly addressed the issue of vice admiralty courts not being
able to use evidence, such as ships, during piracy trials.
More important to the present analysis was what the Acts of 1535 and 1536 did in
changing the responsibility of the crown for piracy. Through these acts and the development of
courts to prosecute piracy, Henry VIII created a shift in how piracy was perceived in relation to
the crown. Now, piracy was no longer viewed as an independent act separate from the monarch
but an act that required the monarch to act in order to diminish those in his realm who attacked
and robbed those at sea. In the same way Hammurabi’s Code portrayed the king’s strength yet
restricted his power at the same time, so too did Henry’s acts addressing piracy. The two acts in
1535 and 1536 strengthened the ability of England to prosecute piracy in their courts. Admirals’
jurisdiction was broadened and the ability of the courtroom to use evidence enhanced. At the
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same time, however, Henry could no longer ignore complaints of piracy committed by his
subjects. These acts were no longer something entirely separate from his crown but rather
crimes that he was required to prosecute effectively in his courts.
While the issue of jurisdiction remained a problem until 1876 with Regina v. Keyn, the
European perception of monarchs’ role in piracy ultimately shifted with this English legislation
through letters concerning Charles V, James V, and Lord Lisle’s attempts to protect Calais. The
Rochepot Affair, a dispute among the English, French, and German states, offers the most
revealing piece of evidence for the change in connecting piracy with the crown on land. The
affair culminated in the accusation of Thomas Cromwell being involved in the theft of a French
ship. The accusation of piracy followed Cromwell to his trial, which ended with the sentence of
death. While a complex situation within the English royal court provided the incentive to
eliminate Cromwell, piracy still held enough sway to be listed as a reason to kill him. Henry
changed piracy from a sea crime which was difficult to convict to a crime which could put a man
to death even if he remained on land during the offense. Henry successfully legally defined
piracy and connected legal disputes at sea to legal disputes on land.
The legal definition and connection to land provided the catalyst for another shift to occur
during Henry’s reign concerning the use of privateers. Prior to the 1540s, privateers did exist.
There is no claim that Henry VIII created the occupation of crown-sanctioned pirating.
However, Henry did shift the publicity with which the crown used these privateers. The French,
known for their work with Barbary corsairs, kept their affairs secret. As portrayed in Chapter
two, Francis I continuously denied any accusations of working alongside Ottoman Turks and
corsairs at sea. In contrast, Henry declared England’s use of privateers in a decree issued in
1544. Not only did Henry differ from the established protocol by openly declaring his use of
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privateers but he added a religious element to the practice. Francis, who used Islamic Barbary
corsairs among his privateers, did not consider religious beliefs when it came time to hire men to
attack enemy countries. Henry, however, hired only Christians, including a large number of
Frenchmen, in his endeavors against the French. This decision only magnified Francis’s
decision to work with infidels at a time of religious turmoil, an issue that Henry actively used
this to his advantage. His heavy reliance on French privateers often came back to haunt him, as
pirates such as Jean Rotz, often deceived him in order to regain the favor of the French monarch
and return to France richer than when they left. Henry’s public declaration of using these men
only strengthened the reliability of their testimonies to the French king and, in turn, altered the
French relation to privateering as well.
Many historians ignore these major shifts concerning piracy and privateering during
Henry’s reign, choosing to emphasize the impact of Elizabeth’s reign instead. While the impact
that Elizabeth had should not be ignored, comparing documents throughout the Tudor dynasty
reveals that much legislation concerning pirates and privateers was directly influenced by her
father’s own decrees. Further, Elizabeth was not the only Tudor monarch after Henry to
implement these decrees and maintain a relationship with privateers while also prosecuting
piracy. Edward VI and Mary I both issued decrees that reveal striking similarities to those
passed by their father. While neither Edward or Mary issued as many decrees as Elizabeth, this
cannot solely be attributed to a lack of interest on their part or a unique interest on Elizabeth’s.
One must keep in mind the brevity of their reigns and the longevity of Elizabeth’s. Through
examining all three subsequent Tudor monarchs, Henry VIII’s own influence and impact on
England’s, and even Europe’s, judicial treatment of piracy and relationship with privateering
cannot be ignored. The reign of Henry VIII saw decisive shifts in defining and prosecuting
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piracy as well as its relation to the crown. With this shift, privateering also took on a new
dynamic as Henry publicly declared his use of privateers within his naval maneuvers against
enemy countries, predominately France. Henry VIII not only helped transform Christianity
during his reign but transformed the legal approach and perception of piracy among courtrooms
and officials which remained in place until the late eighteenth century.
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